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ABSTRACT

Security has become a crucial concern in hardware design due to the growing need of protection in everyday
financial transactions and exchanges of private information. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) utilize
the inevitable process variations and other stochastic properties in devices to provide a unique way to verify
trusted users during access to hardware devices. Improvements in attack methods have recently moved the
field of PUFs from traditional silicon devices toward emerging non-volatile memories, such as phase
change memory (PCM). Due to intrinsic cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle programming variability and high
endurance properties of PCM nano-devices, unpredictable and reconfigurable PUF challenge-response
pairs can be achieved. This programming variability, which comes in addition to the process variations
present in any technology, is an important advantage of PCM for implementations of PUFs and other
hardware security primitives.
In this work, programming variability in PCM nano-devices are electrically characterized using
various cell dimensions and pulsing techniques for PUF applications. The underlying contributing factors,
originating from external circuitry and phase change dynamics of PCM nano-devices, that enhance
programming variability are identified by performing post-measurement scanning electron microscopy
(SEM) imaging, further electrical characterization, SPICE modeling of the experimental setup, and finite
element simulations of PCM devices.
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Once programmed, the short and long-term stability of the programmed states in PCM nanodevices is monitored, and the spontaneous resistance evolution trends for different cell types are studied,
which helped in identifying the cell geometries that result in long data retention time for memory devices,
and those that result in earlier data loss creating opportunities for new security applications, such as timesensitive memory devices. The disturbance to the spontaneous resistance evolution at any programmed state
caused by SEM imaging is also characterized. Imaging is observed to leave remarkable evidence of
tampering posing resistance toward reverse engineering and ensuring robust security to the PCM-based
nano-devices. Lastly, the reconfigurable source of randomness in PCM-based PUFs relying on
programming variability is contrasted with a static source of randomness in a ZnO nanoforest-based PUF.
The advantageous reconfigurability in PCM-based PUFs can ensure resistance toward physical attacks,
which is not achieved with the ZnO nanoforest-based PUF.
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Chapter 1 | Background Studies
1.1

Introduction and Conventional Security Solutions

Security is an inherent need for human life. The security requirements in the current age, however,
have broadened beyond the necessity of protecting tangible property. In the modern world of
internet of things (IoT), countless physical devices, vehicles, home appliances, medical wearables,
factories, smart cities, and many other systems are intricately being connected through sensors and
software and are exchanging data that must be secured [1]. CISCO has predicted an exponential
increase of the number of connected devices with an estimated 6.58 devices per person on average,
worldwide by 2020 [2]. Hence, any breach of security can lead to significant issues in the lives of
large number of individuals by leak of health-related, financial, and private information and can
cause severe economic loss and exposure of confidentiality [3]. Therefore, comprehensive
measures need to be taken to secure not only the cyber space but also the myriads of connected
devices. In this chapter, conventional and novel methods of securing hardware devices are
discussed, and contributions of this dissertation to the hardware security field is introduced.
In a security system, a securely stored secret key is used along with cryptographic
algorithms. The leak of a secret key means that the security of the system has been broken [3]. The
traditional mechanisms to store keys in devices included permanent writing of the secret
information to a battery-backed static random access memory (SRAM) array or on a read only
memory (ROM), and using cryptographic operations, such as digital signature or encryption [4].
The battery-backed SRAM is expensive in terms of area and power requirement due to the volatile
nature of the memory operation [4] and suffers from limited reliability due to the possibility of
1

battery failure. Among the non-volatile key storage solutions, the most common one is the ROMbased, in which masks generate the permanent keys during the manufacturing stage and these are
not erasable or modifiable in the post-manufacturing phase [3]. This technique requires new masks
for each new key and thus prolongs the production time. The major disadvantage of this scheme,
however, is that the secret key is always available in the permanent non-volatile ROM, even when
the device is powered off, allowing opportunities for invasive or physical attacks. Recent advances
in physical attack techniques on electronic chips via fault analysis tools have made it easier to
produce fake security chips, which can serve as clones and continue to communicate in the IoT
environment. The most commonly used tools for invasive attacks are high resolution imaging with
optical microscopy or scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and using destructive measures such
as a focused ion beam (FIB) or a laser cutter to reverse engineer precisely, layer-by-layer. In
microprobing attacks, electrical measurements can reveal the permanent secret key stored in the
permanent memory [3].
Other non-volatile key storage solutions have been proposed using floating gate
technologies (flash memory) but their complex fabrication makes it impractical for PUF
application and these are still vulnerable to leak or manipulation of secret key through
microprobing attacks [3]. Incorporation of powered tamper-sensing and tamper-proof circuits are
required to detect or prevent invasive attacks, respectively, at the cost of additional area and power
[4].
The radio frequency identifier (RFID) tag is one of the commonly used products that stores
secret data permanently. The RFID tag also includes an antenna and communicates with a reader.
The reader has its own antenna, it interrogates an RFID tag with a challenge data signal and
provides the required energy for the tag to operate. The RFID tag transmits back a response signal
2

incorporating the secret information permanently stored in the memory. The reader later
communicates with the host computer for further processing of the communication and secret
information (Figure 1-1). The information is hard-programmed into the RFID memory chip during
manufacturing stages and cannot be erased or modified later. Physical attacks reveal the secret
information and give an adversary the opportunity to produce clone chips. In addition, the RFID
tag is also subject to leak information via eavesdropping, by which an unauthorized reader listens
to the communication between the legitimate tag and reader to steal information or gain access.
The attacker can also record one part of the communication and conduct a replay attack to the
receiving device at a later time [5]. By observing the pattern of power consumption variations
during the correct and the incorrect passcodes, the attacker can conduct a power analysis attack,
which is a side-channel attack to retrieve secret information. The attacker can also pursue a manin-the-middle attack by blocking or manipulating the signal communication path or carry out a
denial-of-service attack by injecting noise and interference into the network, in order to take the
system down [5]. Hence, secret keys should ideally be written with unclonable schemes and in
sufficiently large numbers to avoid physical attacks.

Figure 1-1: Basic working principle of traditional passive radio frequency identification (RFID)
system [5].
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1.2

Hardware Security with PUFs

1.2.1 PUF Introduction
Considering the above-mentioned threats, intrinsic random physical properties of circuits or
devices have been employed, in recent years, to create a distinguishable and unclonable security
primitive. The idea is very similar to the presence of distinct biometrics in individuals (such as,
fingerprints, voice pattern, iris or facial features). The concept was initially introduced as physical
one-way functions (POWF) and physical random functions, and eventually termed as physical
unclonable functions (PUFs). A PUF is queried with a certain input (challenge) and a measurable
output (response) is generated based on the innate unique physical properties of the devices or
circuits that make the PUF system. A PUF can have one or several challenge(s) and response(s),
which are called the challenge-response pair(s) or CRP(s) (Figure 1-2a). The relation between the
challenges and responses or the CRP behavior should not be easily realizable with mathematical
functions and true physical randomness may ensure this. Hence, a PUF is not a mere mathematical
function but rather a procedure with input-output functionality. Moreover, a PUF is not just an
abstract concept but rather has to be always implemented in a physical entity [6]. PUF CRPs can
be either analog or digital bit strings. For analog CRPs, several stages of decoding and quantization
are required to generate the digital bit string CRPs. A PUF system should be easy and economical
to implement yet very hard to clone. A PUF should also be easily measurable within reasonable
time, effort, power, or area [6].

4

1.2.2 PUF Security Metrics
There are several essential features that describe the behavior of a PUF, each described briefly
below (Figure 1-2b-g):

Figure 1-2: (a) Basic working principle of the physical unclonable function (PUF). (b-g) Schematic
representations of essential features of PUF. Schematics redrawn from [7].
i.

Reliability or reproducibility:
The responses generated from the same PUF inquired by the same challenge should always

be very similar during multiple observations (Figure 1-2b). This feature guarantees reproducibility
of responses, and a dissimilarity in the responses generated from the same challenges is called
noise. Reproducibility is a distinct feature of PUF, which makes it different than a true random
5

number generator (TRNG) [6]. For digital bit string responses, the noise is measured with a
hamming distance which is summarized with histograms. A gaussian distribution is often used as
an approximation and the mean (µintra) or the standard deviation (σintra) is calculated to portray the
amount of noise in terms of intra-hamming distance. For reliable PUF responses, µintra is expected
to be as small as possible (ideally ~0%). Minimal noise is expected even for a large range of
variations in environmental factors, such as external temperature, supply voltage, light exposure,
or the effect of aging. Since the environmental effects are systematic, a differential approach is
utilized to nullify the disturbances experienced by all PUFs in case of a linear impact. The
responses generated by two PUFs can either be divided or subtracted to ignore the deviations in
responses due to common environmental contributions. This technique is called compensation [6]
and is one of the measures taken for error correction. A PUF may use multiple error correction
techniques and some of these are vulnerable to leakage of secret information [4].
ii.

Uniqueness:
The responses generated from different PUFs inquired by the same challenge should be

distinguishably different (Figure 1-2c). The span of the dissimilarity of the responses in this case
is mathematically expressed by the inter-hamming distance in terms of the mean (µinter) or the
standard deviation (σinter). For unique PUFs, µinter is expected to be close to ~50%, implying a
random and equal probability of the occurrence of either state in a two bit system [6].
iii.

Unclonable:
The PUF system should be impossible to clone by an adversary even if he has complete

knowledge of a legitimate PUF instance (Figure 1-2d). The impossibility of cloning the system
can arise from uncontrolled manufacturing variations and/or other physical properties manifested
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at the micro- and nano-scales within the devices [7]. Unclonability is the core feature of a PUF.
This property includes two aspects – mathematical unclonability and physical unclonability. A
PUF system is mathematically unclonable if it cannot be formulated in mathematical models and
it is physically unclonable if it cannot be reproduced due to manufacturing variations or the
inherent physics of device operation. A PUF system should satisfy both unclonability aspects to
be truly unclonable [6].
iv.

One-way:
Since, the PUF functionality should not be realizable with simple mathematical

expressions, it should be impossible to invert the PUF behavior mathematically or to estimate an
unknown challenge only by observing a given response (Figure 1-2e) [7].
v.

Unpredictable:
Due to the infeasibility of modeling a PUF system, the knowledge of a given challenge

should not release the expected response either (Figure 1-2f) [7]. A PUF system fails to satisfy this
requirement if an adversary, with access to the full PUF, can predict the upcoming responses for
given challenges based on the knowledge he gained during observations of a set of previous CRPs.
In this case, the adversary would have succeeded to model the PUF system and the cloning would
have broken the unpredictable feature of the PUF [6].
vi.

Tamper-evident:
A physical attack on the PUF system should permanently change its functionality or leave

indelible evidence in the device so that further measurements on the device clearly indicate
tampering (Figure 1-2g) [7].

7

1.2.3 PUF Classification
Based on the construction and operation principle, PUFs can be divided into the two broad
categories of non-electronic and electronic PUFs (Figure 1-3).

Figure 1-3: PUFs classified in terms of construction and working principle [6].
1.2.3.1 Non-electronic PUFs
The non-electronic PUFs rely on the physical variability of any non-electronic stochastic system,
such as optical, magnetic, or acoustic. Digital techniques are eventually used to process the raw
responses generated by a non-electronic PUF [6]. Among the non-electronic PUFs, the optical
8

PUF is the most common one, and optical PUF-like systems were already used in late 80s for
unique identification. Unique optical reflection patterns from sprayed layers with randomly spaced
light-reflecting particles were used for unclonable identification of weapons [8]. At the beginning
of last decade, the unique interference pattern created by randomly spaced light-scattering particles
was employed for an optical POWF, which also introduced the concept of PUF for the first time
[9]. The optical token used in this system was made with a transparent epoxy plate (10×10×2.5
mm) containing randomly placed refractive glass spheres (~500-800 µm diameter spheres with an
average spacing of ~100 µm). The token was irradiated with a laser at a certain angle and the
resulting speckle pattern generated at a screen was recorded by a CCD camera (Figure 1-4a). The
challenge for this PUF system was the angle at which the laser was shone, and the raw response
was the random speckle pattern. Due to the random spatial arrangement of the glass spheres inside
the token, each laser angle resulted in a unique light scattering configuration, which in turn
produced random dark and bright spots on the screen. These raw speckle pattern responses were
then post-processed with a Gabor hash function to create a digital bit string output [9].
Despite detailed experimental validations and high security against modeling and physical
cloning attacks of the optical PUF system, it has been later deemed impractical due to the
cumbersome positioning of the optical system and the difficulty of miniaturizing the design into a
compact chip with precise read-out mechanisms [10]. Designs for integration of such systems into
a chip have later been proposed with the sequential arrangement of the light source array, the same
disordered optical medium, and the sensor array [11] (Figure 1-4b,c).

9

Figure 1-4: (a) Optical physical one-way function (POWF) [9] and (b) later design proposals for
integrated optical PUF. Schematics redrawn from [6] and [11].
Besides optical scattering from randomly distributed particles or shapes, other sources of
randomness that have been proposed for non-electronic PUFs include (Figure 1-3):
i.

the unique and random fiber structure of paper for forgery prevention (scanned for
measurement) [12],

ii.

the random measured lengths of lands and pits on a regular compact disk (CD) (measured
by the electrical signal generated by photodiode inside the CD reader) [13],
10

iii.

the random positioning of thin copper wire within a silicon rubber sealant, (the near-field
scattering of electromagnetic waves (5-6 GHz band) was measured with an RF antenna
array) [14],

iv.

the unique particle pattern in magnetic media of a swipe card [15],

v.

the characteristic frequency spectrum of an acoustic delay line that converts an alternating
electrical signal into mechanical vibration and back [16].

1.2.3.2 Electronic PUFs


Analog Electronic PUFs
The analog electronic PUFs are based on analog measurements of variability-prone

electronic quantities originating from manufacturer variations and quantization processes are
applied to the raw analog responses when digital bit string outputs are desired [6]. Some examples
of such quantities from the literature include:
i.

the threshold voltage variation measured in identically designed transistors in an array [17],

ii.

the resistance variation in power grid of a chip [18],

iii.

capacitance variation in comb-shaped sensors in the top metal layer of an integrated circuit,
where a passive dielectric spray containing random dielectric elements is explicitly
introduced (this PUF is also named as coating PUF) [19],

iv.

the resonant frequency variation in identically designed LC circuits built by a glass plate
sandwiched between two metal plates, along with a serially chained metal coil [20].



Digital Electronic PUFs
Digital PUFs output digital bit(s) as responses. There are two major categories - the digital

delay-based PUFs, which include arbiter PUFs and ring oscillator PUFs and the memory-based
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PUFs, which are based on conventional CMOS memories or emerging non-volatile memories
(NVM) (Figure 1-3).
The arbiter PUF relies on the digital race condition between two symmetrically designed
paths constructed with switch blocks. The switch blocks can be made of a pair of multiplexers and
buffers with two inputs and two outputs in total. Based on a parameter input bit (0 or 1), the input
and the output pairs are connected in either a straight or a switched fashion (Figure 1-5a). The
challenge for the arbiter PUF is the sequence of parameter bits that are fed to the serially connected
switch blocks. Due to manufacturer variations, there is always a slight difference between the two
identically designed paths and thus one path becomes a little faster in propagating the signal. The
random small difference between the two delays is received by an arbiter circuit, which decides
which path wins the race by outputting a 0 or a 1 as the response. The arbiter circuit is made with
a latch or a flip flop [21], [22] (Figure 1-5a). The differential nature of the response from the arbiter
output cancels out the linear environmental factors, such as temperature, power supply voltage, or
aging effects, that both delay lines equally experience [6]. If the delay difference between two
paths is too small the arbiter circuit output will no longer depend on the race but rather will be
determined by random noise, resulting in metastability of the arbiter and noisy PUF responses [6].
By concatenating numerous switch blocks together, a large bit string is created as the
challenge and hence an exponentially large number of CRPs (2n number of CRPs for n switch
blocks) can be generated, despite the one-bit response [21], [22]. Due to the large number of CRPs,
these PUFs are also categorized as strong PUFs and are used for authentication applications. After
being used, each CRP is marked as ‘used’ in the server database so it cannot be reused, thus
avoiding replay attacks [4].

12

Figure 1-5: Delay-based CMOS PUFs: (a) arbiter PUF and (b, c) ring oscillator PUF with division
and comparator compensation techniques. Schematics redrawn from [6].
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Due to the linear additive behavior of digital delays in the basic arbiter PUF, it is possible
to model the entire arbiter PUF system mathematically using machine learning techniques, and
accurate predictions can be made about unused CRPs after observing a certain number of CRPs.
This is called model-building attack and it breaks the security of this PUF [23]. Subsequent works
on arbiter PUFs were intended to make model-building attacks difficult. XOR-arbiter PUFs [24]
and feed-forward arbiter PUFs [25] are two examples of such improvements based on introduction
of nonlinearity to the delay lines. For the feed-forward arbiter PUF, several input challenge bits
were received from the outcomes of some randomly placed intermediate arbiter circuits. However,
these improved arbiter PUFs were shown to still be vulnerable to more advanced model-building
attack techniques [25], [26].
Ring oscillator (RO) PUFs also rely on delay deviations [23]. In an RO circuit, the output
of a digital delay line is fed back to the input to create an asynchronous oscillating loop. Due to
the manufacturer variations, the delay is random on different identically designed circuits, which
in turn determines the resulting random frequency of the oscillation. The frequency is measured
with an edge detector and a digital counter circuit connected at the output of the RO. A
parameterizable delay setting is used as the challenge for this PUF and the measured frequency
value at the counter output is used as the analog response for the basic RO PUF. However, as the
resulting frequency greatly depends on temperature and power supply voltage, the PUF responses
become noisier due to fluctuations in environmental factors. Therefore, compensation techniques
are implemented by either dividing or subtracting the output frequency values from a pair of ring
oscillator PUFs [23] (Figure 1-5b,c). The type of delay circuits used for RO PUFs is the same as
of those used in arbiter PUFs circuit, and hence, similar model-building attacks are possible [21],
[22]. Moreover, an unexpected high correlation exists between the responses generated from (1)
14

the same challenge inquired on different FPGAs and from (2) the different challenges inquired on
the same FPGA [6]. In later works, only one out of 8 pairs of ROs used is selected to improve the
uniqueness and reproducibility features of RO PUF. This technique is termed as 1-out-of-8
masking [4].
PUFs based on conventional CMOS memory rely on the settling state of a destabilized
digital memory circuit (Figure 1-6). A digital memory cell has two or more logical states, and, in
normal operation, it can be programmed to one of these stable states and be used for information
storage. However, if the memory cell is brought to an unstable state, it may start oscillating
between the possible stable states and, after a certain time, converge to a preferred state, depending
on the uncontrolled physical mismatch caused during manufacturing [6]. This concept has been
used to implement PUFs with SRAM, latch, and flip flop circuits.
The SRAM cell is made of two cross-coupled inverters consisting of four metal oxide
semiconductor field effect transistors (MOSFETs) along with two additional access MOSFETs.
Due to the inevitable manufacturer variations, both halves cannot be made exactly identical, and
hence each SRAM cell has a slight inclination toward one of the two logical states (0 or 1) at
power-up condition. For SRAM PUF, the powering up is the challenge, and the one bit settling
state is the response, resulting in a single CRP per cell [27] (Figure 1-6a). Due to the limited
number of CRPs and the linear relation between the CRP size and the number of components,
these PUFs are also categorized as weak PUFs and are used for key generation applications [4].

15

Figure 1-6: Memory based CMOS PUFs: (a) SRAM PUF, (b) latch PUF, and (c) butterfly PUF.
Schematics redrawn from [6].
Very similar concepts have also been applied as:
i.

latch PUF, where two cross-coupled NOR gates are brought to an unstable state by a reset
signal (as the challenge) and the settling state is observed (as the response) [28] (Figure
1-6b),

ii.

butterfly PUF, where two cross-coupled latches are brought to an unstable state by a
clear/preset function (as the challenge) and the settling state is observed (as the response)
[29] (Figure 1-6c),

iii.

flip-flop PUF, where power-up condition (challenge) results in a settling state (response)
[30].
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1.2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Different PUFs
All the above-mentioned PUF technologies, along with the permanent key storage schemes, can
generate unique identifiers or keys. The permanent key storage schemes, however, require hardprogramming during manufacturing to generate the keys and are vulnerable to physical cloning.
For PUFs, in contrast, the uncontrollable process variations prevent manufacturing an exact
physical copy [6].
The delay-based PUFs (basic arbiter, feed forward arbiter, and the ring oscillator PUFs)
are prone to model-building attacks and thus fail the unpredictability requirement of PUF. Even
though the CRP size is exponentially large for the arbiter PUFs, the security is in peril when even
a relatively small number of CRPs have been observed by the attacker. On the other hand, the
CMOS memory based PUFs (SRAM, latch, and butterfly PUFs) can be read exhaustively and the
entire CRP database will be known to the attacker. For these memory-based PUFs, the number of
CRPs is linear with the number of cells in the array, and thus it is easier for an attacker to
accomplish the knowledge of the entire CRP database [31]. The same problem also exists for the
coating PUF and ring oscillator PUF with comparator compensation and 1-out-of-8 masking.
Hence, mathematical cloning of all these CMOS-based PUFs can be made even though physical
cloning of such technologies is impossible. Once manufactured, the physical mismatch that
determines the preferred output state for a given challenge stays unchanged for the lifetime of these
PUFs. Hence, there is no option to refresh the CRPs for these PUF technologies [6].
To increase security against mathematical cloning, controlled PUFs (CPUFs) have been
proposed, in which the PUF is complemented with cryptographic algorithms. In CPUF, the PUF
is accessed only by the algorithm. A cryptographic hash function is used to generate randomly
picked challenges so that model building attacks can be avoided (although this method cannot
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thwart the model-building attack on arbiter PUF). The random challenges are used to interrogate
the PUF and the generated responses are then fed to an error correction code (ECC) to improve
the reliability or minimize noise. The output of the ECC is then inputted to another cryptographic
hash function which breaks the link between the responses and the actual physical details of the
PUF measurements [6], [23] (Figure 1-7a).

Figure 1-7: Working principles of (a) controlled PUF [6], (b) logically reconfigurable PUF [32],
and (c) physically reconfigurable PUF [32]. C, R, Rʹ stand for challenge, response, and
reconfigured response, respectively. Cint and Rint refer to intermediate challenge and responses.
Another way to increase security of the system has been accomplished by reconfigurable
PUFs (RPUFs). In an RPUF, the partial or complete CRP can be refreshed irreversibly, and
thereby a completely new PUF is created after every refresh. The RPUFs are categorized into two
types – logically and physically reconfigurable PUFs (L-RPUFs and P-RPUFs). In L-RPUF, the
responses are interfaced with a multiplexer, control logic, or control query algorithm for the
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reconfiguration purpose (Figure 1-7b) [33]. In P-RPUF, in contrast, the responses are intrinsically
altered due to the physical mechanism involved in refreshing the material properties, which is not
only more efficient than L-RPUF in terms of area but also more secure against tampering because
of the physical origin of stochasticity (Figure 1-7c) [32], [34].

1.3

Nanodevice-based PUFs

CMOS based PUFs received significant attention and were the focus of rigorous research efforts
for many years. However, the unaddressed challenges of overcoming mathematical clonability
have recently shifted the focus in the PUF field toward novel nanotechnologies and nanomaterials.
Moreover, CMOS technology is approaching its scaling limits and new technologies are emerging
to continue to deliver performance improvements with smaller devices [35].
For storage applications, various kinds of resistive switching memory technologies have
been demonstrated with promising speed, endurance, retention time, scalability, and energy
efficiency. The most progress has been made in the fields of phase change memory (PCM),
resistive random access memory (RRAM), and spin-transfer torque magnetic random access
memory (STT-MRAM) technologies. These nanodevices offer easy fabrication with simple cell
structures (Figure 1-8) [36]. All these technologies incorporate compact two-terminal devices
relying on resistive switching. These memory devices can be reversibly programmed to various
resistance levels by suitable electrical pulses. The programmed states are easily distinguishable as
distinct states and are stable under normal operating conditions (such as room temperature and
supply voltage) assuring long data retention time.
These novel memories can potentially produce light-weight, robust, secure, and
reconfigurable PUFs and other security primitives to meet the next generation security challenges.
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An intrinsic property of these nanodevices, variability, typically a disadvantage for memory
implementation, is an important advantage for PUF applications (in addition to the existing process
variation present in any technology). The programming variability is observed on the same cell for
different cycles of operation (cycle-to-cycle variability) as well as on different cells for the same
programming conditions (cell-to-cell variability). As the randomness originates from the
stochastic rearrangement at the atomic scale, it is impossible to formulate or predict the variability
pattern. The cycle-to-cycle programming variability allows the reconfigurability feature for a PUF,
since new CRPs are obtained after each reprogramming. The cell-to-cell programming variability
in nanodevices, on the other hand, is the result of the innate programming variability as well as the
process-related variations.

Figure 1-8: Schematics of typical cell structures for (a) Phase change memory (PCM), (b) resistive
random access memory (RRAM), and (c) spin-transfer torque magnetic random access memory
(STT-MRAM) cells (not drawn to scale).
The resistance variation observed at either of the programmed states is also a source of
variability for PUFs utilizing these nanodevices [37], [38]. For the resistance-variability based
PUF, each challenge does not require a programming operation and a low-voltage read operation
is enough. In contrast, the programming variability based PUFs require a programming pulse for
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each challenge inquiry, which is expensive in terms of power. However, the reconfigurability
feature is the attractive feature for the programming variability based PUFs, by which the
uncertainty of the same PUF is refreshed with each new reprogramming to thwart physical attack
[32].

1.3.1 Phase Change Memory
PCM was first introduced by Ovshinsky in late 1960s with the Ovonic threshold switch (OTS)
phenomenon [39], which also showed promise for repeated memory operation [40]. However, the
low programming speed and the high programming energy obtained from the prototype devices
[41] waned interest in PCM as an electronic memory and rather deviated the following research
initiatives toward the optical data storage field during the 1990s and 2000s [42]. In the early 2000s,
advances in PCM materials with improved scalability, speed, and resistivity contrast led to
renewed interest in PCM. PCM was then envisioned as a ‘universal memory’ that could potentially
replace both DRAM and NAND flash. [43]. However, the high reset current in PCM hindered the
scaling pace to compete with NAND flash and the writing speed and endurance could not reach
DRAM standards either. Considering all the progress and remaining limitations, PCM is now
regarded as storage class memory (SCM), a complementary technology to bridge the latency gap
between NAND flash and DRAM (Figure 1-9) [43], [44], together with RRAM and MRAM. PCM
can either serve as storage-type SCM, for which high density is the main requirement, or as
memory-type SCM, for which high endurance (≥1012) and high reset and set speeds (<50 ns) are
the critical requirements. Multi-level per cell (MLC) storage (e.g. 2 bits per cell with four distinct
resistance states) and further progress in scaling, beyond the 4-6 F2 cell with sub-10 nm feature
size, can lead to further improvements of PCM [43], [45].
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Figure 1-9: Comparison of the latency of different memory and storage technologies. PCM along
with RRAM and MRAM are competing to bridge the latency gap between the conventional
memory and storage devices [46].
PCM stores information on the phase of a chalcogenide material that can be reversibly
switched between two (or more) stable states with distinct resistance levels. The high resistance
state (HRS) in PCM is the amorphous or reset state and the low resistance state (LRS) is the
crystalline or set state (Figure 1-10). The most used and studied phase change material has been
the Ge2Sb2Te5 compound (GST-225) due to its crystallization speed, stability, and resistivity
contrast between the amorphous and crystalline phases. In a typical PCM cell the GST material is
sandwiched between two contacts. The mushroom cell has been the standard cell, in which the
phase-change material is placed above a nanoscale bottom contact, called the heater, since it
defines the highest current density region for Joule heating and the minimum amorphous plug
required to block conduction in the high resistance state [47], [48].
For amorphization (reset), an amorphous plug is created on the phase change material just
above the heater (also called the active region) by rapid cooling after melting at or above ~900 K
(melt-quench) by a high amplitude short electric pulse (typically <50 ns) terminated abruptly [43].
The rapid quench results in random atomic rearrangements upon solidification and leaves the
material in its amorphous phase (Figure 1-11a). For crystallization (set), an electric pulse with
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moderate amplitude and longer duration (100 ns − 10 µs [43]) brings the active region above the
crystallization temperature (~500 K) yet below the melting temperature, for a sufficient period to
allow re-crystallization (Figure 1-11b,c).

Figure 1-10: Schematics of the reset (amorphization), the set (crystallization), and the low-voltage
read operations in PCM [47].

Figure 1-11: (a) Crystalline or set state and (b) amorphized or reset state in a mushroom cell.
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The high reset current requirement in mushroom cell necessitates large selector device,
blocking the path toward further scaling [43]. Later cell designs showed improved power
consumption and reliability, and currently the preferred cells are confined cells which improve
thermal confinement and minimize the active region that must be amorphized and crystallized
[49]. PCM operation has been demonstrated for active regions as small as ~1 nm using a carbon
nanotube as the critical contact [50], thus demonstrating PCM high scalability potential compared
to other traditional memory technologies. Alternative compositions of GST or other chalcogenide
materials, as well as alternative deposition methods such as atomic layer deposition (ALD) and
chemical or physical vapor deposition (CVD or PVD), have also shown improved and promising
endurance [51], low reset currents [52], fast crystallization and good scalability.
The large memory window in PCM (resistance contrast between the amorphous and
crystalline phases) enables MLC storage, by which programming to multiple, distinct resistance
levels between the full reset and set states allows for storage of more than one bit per cell for a
significant increase in memory density (Figure 1-12a) [53]. The intermediate states are achieved
by partial reset or partial set operations either with a single pulse, with amplitude in between that
of the full reset and the full set pulses, or gradually by applying repeated smaller amplitude reset
or set pulses [54]–[56]. By applying appropriate voltages to the perpendicularly arranged word
line and bit line metals, the PCM cell at the cross-point is addressed in the crossbar architecture
(Figure 1-12b) [46], [47]. Besides device downsizing, MLC, and crossbar architecture, high
density is also achieved with the 3D stackability of PCM (Figure 1-12b).
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Figure 1-12: (a) Large memory window in PCM cells enable multi-level cell (MLC) operation
with highly dense mixed states. (b) 3−dimensionally integrable crossbar architecture for high
density PCM [47].

1.3.2 Useful Properties of PCM for PUFs
1.3.2.1 Programming Variability
Despite the tremendous progress made in PCM device research for the past few years, PCM has
the cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle resistance variability issue. The variability can occur during both
the reset and set operations, even if the pulse parameters are chosen for successful switching. This
phenomenon is known as programming or switching variability and it can be more severe in the
weak programming regimes, i.e. in partial reset and partial set operations. An attempt to program
a cell toward the partial reset regime from the crystalline state may not always be successful and a
moderate pulse chosen for this operation may leave the cell unchanged, at the initial crystalline
state, or instead program it fully into the high resistance amorphous state [57]. These unpredictable
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partial programming operations in PCM limit memory performance but enable valuable
implementations for PUF applications.
The cycle-to-cycle stochastic nature in the reset operation originates from the random
atomic rearrangement that takes place during the rapid melt-quench process [58]. On the other
hand, the cycle-to-cycle stochastic nature in the set operation stems from the random spatial
arrangement of the seed crystals that remain or nucleate after amorphization and from where
crystallization will proceed [59], [60]. Moreover, the initial state for either operation also varies
depending on the history of the cell. For example, the initial crystalline resistance of the same cell
is an important factor on the result of the following operation and compounds on the overall
variability. In case of the cell-to-cell programming variability, for both reset and set operations,
process variations also add to the intrinsic cell variability. Process variations include geometry
variations (thickness, length, or width of the active regions and contacts) and local material
variations.
1.3.2.2 Resistance Drift
Due to spontaneous resistance drifts, PCM cells do not remain at the programmed resistance levels,
and the drift history of cells also add to the variabilities in following programming cycles. The
hexagonal close packed (hcp) phase is the stable phase of GST and does not experience drift but
devices typically operate between the metastable amorphous and crystalline face centered cubic
(fcc) and both phases experience resistance drifts. The crystalline fcc state shows a slight upward
resistance drift within typical time scales and, for longer periods it slowly transitions to the stable
hcp phase with a decrease in resistance. The amorphous phase, on the other hand, shows a
significant steady upward resistance drift at the beginning, which saturates after a certain time
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(depending on temperature) after which the resistance also decreases until complete crystallization.
The resistance drift trends accelerate with temperature causing faster data loss at higher
temperatures [61]–[65] (Figure 1-13a and Figure 1-14b). The upward resistance drift in amorphous
phase follows a power-law behavior, and the slope of the bi-logarithmic resistance-time plot is
called the drift exponent or drift coefficient [66] (Figure 1-13b):

t

R  R0 t 0





n

(1-1)

where R is the reset resistance at time t, t is the time after amorphization, R0 and t0 are constants,
and n is the drift exponent which is the slope of the bi-logarithmic R-t plot [66]. Upward resistance
drift has been reported to initiate as soon as 30 ns after the resetting operation [58]. High-speed
electrical characterization of long-term resistance drift measurement on PCM line cells performed
by Dirisaglik et al. delineates the temperature dependence of the amorphous-to-crystalline phase
transition from 104 μs after amorphization pulse (Figure 1-13a). Whereas at room temperature it
takes ∼13 months to observe the turn-around in resistance drift, at ∼400 K it is observed after only
∼100 s. At ∼675 K the upward drift is presumably too fast to be captured in these measurements
and crystallization to hcp is complete after ∼200 ms [65], [67]. Higher drift coefficient indicates
faster increase of the amorphous resistance during the upward resistance drift.
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Figure 1-13: (a) Experimental results of resistance drift observed from GST-225 line cells at
various temperature levels by Dirisaglik et al. (b) Drift coefficient measured from the resistance
vs time bi-logarithmic plot measured from a line cell at 400 K [65], [67].
The physical origin of the upward resistance drift is not well understood yet. The current
explanation of this drift is related to structural relaxation of the amorphous material, which is a
thermally activated process of atomistic level rearrangement of the disordered amorphous network
[66]. During this process, annihilation of the structural defects (vacancies, distorted and dangling
bonds) is believed to occur in order to achieve a more stable amorphous state. Since Poole-Frenkel
hopping is considered to be the dominant conduction mechanism in amorphous state, the reduction
of the available localized states for carrier hopping is understood to give rise to a steady increase
in amorphous resistance [66]. A widening of the optical amorphous bandgap has been correlated
with the resistance increase and supports this hypothesis [68]. Structural relaxation process alone,
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however, does not explain the turn-around at a maximum resistance and rapid reduction in
resistance afterwards.

Figure 1-14: (a) Experimental results of spread of drift coefficients and its dependency on
temperature based on the electrical measurements performed by Dirisaglik et al. in Figure 1-13a.
The small scatter points are the drift coefficients measured on different cells and the large scatter
points are the average of all values measured at the corresponding temperature. (b) Dependency
of crystallization time on temperature [65], [67].
The alternative hypothesis presented by Dirisaglik et al. shows that the crystallization
process is initiated immediately after amorphization by nucleating seed crystallites and result in
the initial upward and later downward resistance drift as the material relaxes toward the stable hcp
phase. The mechanical strain induced by these crystallites creates defects and increases the
bandgap of amorphous GST. Charges can be temporarily trapped into these defects and surface
states at amorphous-crystalline boundaries. As the nuclei continue to grow, the crystalline islands
start to act as bulk fcc degenerate semiconductor and form potential wells that capture free carriers
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(Figure 1-15i-ii). Charge trapping by the nuclei results in a decrease in conductivity of the
surrounding amorphous material leading to increasing resistance as nucleation and trapping
progress. When the number and size of grains are sufficient to initiate percolation transport, the
resistance starts decreasing [59], [65], [67], [69]–[71] (Figure 1-15iv-vi).

Figure 1-15. Schematic illustration of the resistance increase over time due to the resistance drift
mechanism described by the charge trapping model of Dirisaglik et al. via nucleation (i-ii), capture
of free holes and distortion of the potential profile (iii), and the succeeding decrease of resistance
as a consequence of growth of the crystalline nuclei, initiation of percolation transport (iv-v) and
crystallization [65], [67].
In the relaxation model, the increase in the upward resistance drift exponent with
temperature is attributed to the thermal activation of the structural relaxation process [66], [72]
and the faster resistance decrease is explained by both larger nucleation and growth rates at
elevated temperature [69].
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The upward resistance drift is described by the characteristic drift exponent (n) [66]. The
drift exponent is a function of temperature [65]–[67], read current [66], and amorphous resistance
level [58]. Amorphous resistance is expected to exhibit stronger upward resistance drift (i.e. larger
n or steeper slope in the log(R)-log(t) plot) at higher temperature, lower read current, and higher
amorphous resistance levels [58]. A high read current causes localized heat in the cell and thus
affects the cell properties in a similar way as increasing the temperature [73].
Other factors also affect the drift exponents as cells with the same initial amorphous
resistance values have been observed to drift with variable drift exponents. The upward resistance
drift variability has been ascribed to different amorphous structures ensued after the random meltquenched reset process and shown to increase with increasing amorphous resistance [58]. The
variability of the drift exponent increases at higher temperature levels (Figure 1-14a) [67] and at
higher amorphous resistance [58].

Figure 1-16: Schematic example of random spatial arrangement of the seed crystals nucleated
inside the amorphous plug resulting in random resistance evolution over time during the
crystallization process in PCM mushroom cell. Schematic redrawn from [60].
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Spontaneous crystallization of PCM devices exhibits cycle-to-cycle (for a single cell) and
device-to-device (in an array) stochastic variations [59], [60]. As the downward resistance drift is
described by both nucleation and growth of the crystallites inside amorphous volume, the erratic
resistance evolution over time is attributed to the random space configuration of the nuclei and the
resulting percolation patterns [59]. The increase of the statistical spread and decrease of data
retention time has been mentioned to arise from several factors:
(a) Geometrical parameters: Smaller amorphous volumes have shorter data retention times
because the same number of nucleation events have a greater effect on crystallization.
Additionally, a few nucleation events within smaller amorphous region result in increased
statistical spread of cell resistance [59]. From the resistance drift measurement results in
PCM line cells of various dimensions by Dirisaglik et al. (different lengths and widths yet
same thickness), decrease of resistance after reaching the maximum value is slower in
wider line cells [64], [67] (Figure 1-17). The longer time needed for the growth of nuclei
to reach the percolation threshold may be a reason for the slower downward resistance drift
in wider structures.
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Figure 1-17. Experimental result of dimension dependent phase transition of GST wires [67].
(b) Environmental parameters:
i.

Temperature: Due to the accelerated growth of the crystallites in amorphous region
at higher temperatures, data retention time goes down (Figure 1-13a) while the
statistical spread increases [74]. The maximum working temperature of PCM cells has
been extrapolated as 105ᴼ C from the temperature dependent retention time [75].

ii.

Read current: As expected, higher read currents are also reported to perturb the cells’
state and result in data loss by accelerating the phase transition process; this
phenomenon is referred to as read disturb [73], [76].

iii.

Thermal cross-talk: Programming a cell can also cause unintentional heating of
neighboring cells in an array due to thermal cross talk. Longer pulse durations and
repeated programming of cells at smaller lithographic pitch are reported to accelerate
the data loss of the adjacent bits; this phenomenon is referred to as program disturb
[73].
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1.3.2.3 Noise
PCM devices also exhibit various types of noise and fluctuations in electrical current
measurements. Random telegraph noise (RTN) has been observed at intermediate states (~600 kΩ
resistance level of µ-trench cells [77]) when read with a certain voltage and at a certain ambient
temperature. The RTN has been ascribed to the same physical mechanism causing the amorphous
resistance drift, i.e. structural relaxation. The random possibility for a defect to reside on one of
the two equally energetically favorable states is reported for the possible mechanism for RTN [77].
Moreover, current measurements at crystalline and amorphous states of PCM show random
fluctuations of current, known as the 1/f behavior or the flicker noise [78].
The programming variability, resistance drifts, read disturb, thermal cross-talk, and RTN
noise in PCM devices cause reliability problems for memory implementations but can be utilized
for hardware security applications such as PUFs or true random number generators (TRNGs).

1.3.3 PCM-based PUF Reports
1.3.3.1 Concept-only
Among the very few PCM-based PUFs reported, the first one was a concept-only work, by
Kursawe et al. in 2009 [34], with the introduction of RPUF or reconfigurable PUF (described in
section 1.2.4 in page 17) for the first time. According to the authors, the read process in PCM is
much more controlled than the writing process. Thus, the randomly programmed state in an MLC
scheme can generate the random multi-bit responses and can be reconfigured as a new PUF, with
refreshed set of CRPs, by re-programming the cell every time. This work described the idea only,
with no simulation or experimental validation.
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1.3.3.2 Simulation
The following two works on PCM-based PUFs were published by Zhang et al. in 2013 and 2014.
The first one, PCKGen or PCM cryptographic key generator, was demonstrated with simulation
[79], while the second one showed detailed experimental validation of slightly different
approaches [32]. For this PUF, the challenge was the addresses of a pair of PCM cells that were
reconfigured, and the response was the comparison between the cell resistances. The first paper
[79] was based on three core points:
i.

Due to the natural log-normal distribution of the PCM cell resistance, a logarithmic
amplifier (LogAmp) was employed to the cell read path to reshape the cell resistance
distribution in the linear domain. This method removed the undesired bias in the bit pattern
of the cryptographic key output and maximized the entropy.

ii.

An imprecisely controlled current-pulse regulator (ICCR) was used to generate
probabilistic current pulses to reconfigure the PCM cells. The ICCR incorporates a currentmode digital-to-analog converter (DAC) and a pulse shaper. These two circuits generate
m-bit and n-bit digital bit strings to control the amplitude and the duration of the applied
current pulses to the PCM cells, respectively. A similar approach was also used in their
following experimental work [32] (described in section 1.3.3.3 in page 36), with voltage
pulses instead of the current pulses for programming.

iii.

A post-processing module (PPM) was used to improve the raw response quality. The
authors indicated that the raw responses might incorporate noise and might not be truly
random. The PPM helped the responses to be unpredictable and stable over time. ECC or
error correction code with helper data (stored in non-volatile PCM cells with well-
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maintained security) and a subsequent hash function were used to improve the response
quality.
A numerical PCM model [80] was used for the simulations performed in this chapter along
with the simulations of the auxiliary CMOS circuits with Cadence 90 nm design environment. The
simulation of the security analysis showed improved bias with the LogAmp, a reduced error rate
with ECC, and ~50% of uniqueness with the hash function [79].
1.3.3.3 Experimental Validation
In the experimental validation of the simulation-based work presented in reference [79], 180-nm
PCM cells were used with both single and repeated pulsing attempts separately. The address of a
PCM cell was used for the challenge, and the resulting resistance upon the reconfiguration or
reprogramming was the response for this PUF [32]. For the single pulse programming approach,
the partial reset programming method was used, which requires less programming time as
compared to the partial set operation. Using stair-case down (SCD) pulses, the entire PCM array
was initialized to the full-set state to maintain similar initial conditions for all cells prior to the
programming. The PCM cells were then partially reset with single rectangular applied pulses with
variable pulse amplitudes and durations, defined as non-uniform programming scheme (Figure
1-18). The authors indicated that the programmed resistance of the identical PCM cells should
only depend on the fabrication process variations and the applied programming pulse parameters.
However, this statement overlooks the inherent programming variability originating from the
nanoscale switching mechanism in PCM, which is a key contributing factor for the cell-to-cell
programming stochasticity, besides the unavoidable process variations [32].
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Figure 1-18: Using the (a) uniform and (b) non-uniform programming pulse parameters for
achieving spread of programmed resistance for PCM-based RPUF [32].

Figure 1-19: (a, b) The conventional approaches of generating random configuration states with
hash-mode and TRNG-mode along with digital-to-analog converters (DAC). C and R refer to
challenge and response, respectively. The configuration state S is prone to physical attack for both
cases. (c) Random configuration state generation using imprecisely controlled regulator (ICR)
along with DAC is reported to be more secure [32].
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The random pulse parameters for the non-uniform programming were generated using an
imprecisely controlled regulator (ICR), as in their simulation-based work (described in section
1.3.3.2 in page 35), which was argued to be a more secure scheme against physical attacks as
compared to the conventional hash-mode and TRNG-mode methods with digital-to-analog
converters (DAC). The ICR circuit includes a programming voltage generator and a pulse
generator [32].
An m-bit binary input string can produce 2m possible configuration states for the
programming voltage amplitudes and an n-bit binary input string randomly selects the delay chain
from n sets of invertor delay chains, hence, 2n possible pulse durations can be generated [32].
The large number of random challenges (2m×2n) generated by concatenating the two input
strings from the ICR is applied to program or reconfigure the PCM cells. Even though the
challenge bits get revealed from a limited number of CRP observations due to the linear behavior
of the voltage and pulse generator circuits, the inherent physical variability in PCM programming
will not allow an attacker to predict the response. The reliability test done at different temperatures
showed that the intra-hamming distance measured at higher temperature is larger than the desired
small values. Thus, several ECCs were considered to improve the uniformity. The unpredictability
test conducted on different cells on the array also showed slight skew (~30%) and the unclonability
test performed on different chips showed ~40% inter-hamming distance. As the raw responses
were the resulting programmed resistance values, which depend on the physical uncertainty in the
partial amorphization mechanism in PCM cells, these skews are expected. The raw responses were
post-processed using hash function in the fuzzy extractor to improve the unpredictability and
unclonability features of the PUF [32].
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This design included not only large numbers of CRPs but also the refreshability feature of
each PCM cell which renders a new set of CRPs after each reprogramming. Hence, it results in a
PUF with strong unpredictability or mathematical unclonability against model-building attacks
[32]. However, the authors indicated that attacks through exhaustive reading attempts in between
two consecutive reconfigurations are still possible and need to be prevented with additional
features. Two possible measures were proposed to address this problem [32]:
i.

Periodic refresh: the CRPs are refreshed in a periodic fashion after every tR duration. A
clock can be used to monitor the time elapsed.

ii.

Frequency-based refresh: the CRPs are refreshed after a certain number of evaluations nR
take place. A counter can be used to monitor the number of evaluations.
In the same work [32], an alternative partial reset programming strategy with gradually

increasing repeated pulses (termed as stair case up or SCU) was also used along with a programand-verify scheme. In this programming method, the cell resistance was measured in between the
consecutive programming pulses and compared with a target programmed resistance (Rtarget) to
determine if additional pulses were required. Based on the manufacturing variations, as indicated
by the authors, in addition to the programming variability itself (which was not taken into account
in reference [32]), the number of pulses required to reach a certain Rtarget varied randomly.
Moreover, the use of the varying step incremental voltage and the varying pulse durations
introduced additional variability to the responses. The challenge for the PUF was again the cell
address, and the raw response was the number of pulses required to generate a certain Rtarget. The
raw responses were post-processed for quantization of the output into digital bits. The error
probability in the PUF output increased with increasing number of output bits used for
quantization. By increasing the programming time with the gradual reset method, the total
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programming time was made equal to the time between two consecutive reconfigurations in the
single pulse programming method. Hence, the number of accessible CRP between two
reconfigurations was only one, significantly improving the security of the repeated pulse
programming as compared to the single pulse programming [32].
1.3.3.4 TRNG (Simulation-based)
A recent work has discussed the dependence of programming variability on the PCM cell design
and how this can be leveraged for hardware security purposes [81]. This paper reports that since
in mushroom cells or µ-trench cells the active region (volume that is switched between amorphous
and crystalline) is adjacent to the contact, the switching mechanism is strongly dependent on the
shape of the heater-chalcogenide interface and on the heater material used [82], [83]. These cells
were observed to have smaller programming variability and the process variations (mostly on the
heater definition) are likely to dominate over the variability associated with the switching location
within the PCM material. In contrast, in line cells the active region is within the phase change
material, away from the contacts, and the larger variability in these cells is due mostly to the
switching variations within the PCM material [84], [85]. The authors indicated that the variability
in PCM line cells can be even larger than that observed for oxide-based resistive RAMs which are
known for large programming variability [86]. The authors have simulated the switching from the
full-reset state using a pre-calibrated voltage for a large number of PCM line cells. The cells fail
or succeed to switch toward the crystalline resistance state with equal probability and this random
switching was proposed for TRNG implementations.
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1.3.4 PCM-PUF vs Other PUFs
Table 1-1, adapted from the review by R. Maes and I. Verbauwhede in 2010 [6], compares the
main PUF properties for different technologies that have been considered. In Table 1-1, the
security performance properties of PCM-based PUFs have been added as the last row. It is
interesting to note that PCM and optical PUFs are the only types considered to be mathematically
unclonable, an important feature for high-security applications. It is also important to emphasize
here that PCM-based PUFs (and other emerging NVM-based PUFs, such as RRAM-PUFs or STTMRAM-PUFs) are reconfigurable PUFs which also enables higher-security implementations.
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Table 1-1: Comparison of various PUF properties for different technologies. Table adapted from Maes, R., Verbauwhede, I.: ‘Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State
of the Art and Future Research Directions’, in (2010), pp. 3–37. The PCM-based PUF properties have been added here as the last row.
Mathematic
Tamper
RePhysically
UnPUF name
Randomness type
Challenge
Response
Unique?
-ally
evident?
producible? unclonable?
predictable?
unclonable?
Secret key is explicitly hardRFID-like
Interrogation
Permanent
programmed during
-Yes
Yes
No
No
No
protocol
by a reader
secret key
manufacture
Laser
Gabor hash of
Optical PUF
Explicitly introduced
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
orientation
speckle pattern
Sensor
Quantized
Coating PUF
Explicitly introduced
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No§
Yes
selection
capacitance
Basic arbiter
Implicit manufacturer
Delay line
Arbiter decision
-Yes
Yes
Yes
No¥
!ϼ
PUF
variability
setting
Feed-forward
Implicit manufacturer
Delay line
Arbiter decision
-Yes
Yes
Yes
No¥
!ϼ
arbiter PUF
variability
setting
RO PUF w/
Implicit manufacturer
Delay line
Frequency
-Yes
Yes
Yes
No¥
!ϼ
division
variability
setting
division
RO PUF w/
Implicit manufacturer
Loop pair
Frequency
comparator &
-Yes
Yes
Yes
No§
Yes
variability
selection
comparison
1-out-of-8 mask
Implicit manufacturer
SRAM
SRAM PUF
Power-up state
-Yes
Yes
Yes
No§
Yes
variability
address
Settling state of
Implicit manufacturer
Latch
Latch PUF
destabilized
-Yes
Yes
Yes
No§
Yes
variability
selection
latch
Implicit manufacturer
Settling state of
Butterfly PUF
Cell selection
-Yes
Yes
Yes
No§
Yes
variability
destabilized cell
PCM PUF
Implicit manufacturer
based on
Programmed or
variability & Programming
Cell selection
Yes*
Yes
Yes||
Yes
Yesᴥ
Yes
programming
not?
variability
variability
*Tamper evidence feature can be implemented using the read disturb property and thermal cross-talk of PCM (if read voltages are sufficiently high). Tamper evidence of SEM
imaging attack is discussed with experimental characterization in Chapter 6.
||For a PCM-PUF based on the variability of resistance of cells programmed to either state, the CRP can be reproduced. The CRPs based on amorphous and crystalline fcc states can,
however, become noisy at elevated temperatures and also overtime due to resistance drifts (these do not affect the stable crystalline hcp states). For the programming variability
based PCM PUF, the challenge is a programming pulse after an initializing crystallization procedure. It might not be possible to obtain the same programming result on consecutive
trials of the same applied programming pulse on the same PCM cell to check reproducibility if weak programming strategy is used to randomly pass or fail a cell to program.
However, the reading operations done before the next programming cycle will retain the state due to nonvolatility and long retention time, and hence, the reproducibility of the state
during read can be ensured for a certain programming cycle. Moreover, in the programming variability-based PCM PUF, the CRPs can be refreshed by reprogramming the cell
(periodically or after a certain number of measurements) to prevent physical attacks and this can be done for very large number of times, limited by cell endurances, >~ 1010 cycles).
§By exhaustively reading out all CRPs. ¥By model-building attack.
ᴥPCM programming variability depends on complex stochastic switching mechanisms within the phase change material that cannot be predicted or modeled exactly.
ϼWhen an adversary learns more and more CRPs, it becomes increasingly easier to predict the unseen CRPs.
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1.4

Contribution of This Dissertation

In this dissertation, detailed electrical characterization of PCM line cells has been performed to
advance the current state of PCM-based hardware security applications. Figure 1-20 shows a
schematic diagram of the topics included in the following chapters.

Figure 1-20: Contributions of this dissertation in the hardware security field and the topics included
in the following chapters.
The use of PCM devices for binary and multi-bit PUF implementations is discussed in
Chapter 2 and 3, respectively. In Chapter 4, a technique for estimation of the amorphized length
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in the PCM line cells and the variations of this length in multiple amorphous cells using electrical
characterization is described. Chapter 5 presents a potential application of the spontaneous
resistance evolution in PCM for time-sensitive or time-bound security applications. In Chapter 6,
the tamper evidence property for SEM imaging attack is studied by monitoring the resistance
evolutions of imaged and unimaged cells. Finally, the reconfigurable source of randomness – the
refreshable programming property of PCM cells – is contrasted with a static source of randomness
in a ZnO nanoforest-based PUF in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation with an outlook
to future work.
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Chapter 2 | Reset Variability in PCM for Binary PUF
2.1

Abstract

The rapid quench from melt associated with the reset operation in phase change memory is a
suitable physical process to leverage programming variability for hardware security. In this
chapter, cell-to-cell programming variability in Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST) line cells has been
experimentally characterized using a single reset voltage pulse with moderate amplitude. It has
been observed that the cell dimensions and programming pulse parameters play a critical role on
the programming variability. Cells with larger length-to-width ratios (L/W ≥ 1.8) show greater
programming variability when moderate reset voltage amplitudes (Vapplied) are applied. This
variability is further increased with shorter pulse edges (tedge) of the applied pulses. A study for a
reset-variability-based physical unclonable function (PUF) has been performed with 85 cells (with
L/W = 4) by applying identical single pulses with shorter tedge and a pre-calibrated Vapplied. Cells
are randomly programmed to the full reset (high-resistance-state or HRS), or the partial reset or
set (low-resistance-state or LRS) states with an equal probability and the two states are separated
by ~1.5 order of magnitude. No bit flipping is observed after 9 months of programming and
instead, the separation increases to ~3 orders of magnitude because of the upward and downward
resistance drift of the HRS and LRS states. The underlying physical mechanisms behind the
enhanced variability are identified as thermal runaway at the onset of GST melting and the
additional current overshoot due to the parasitic capacitances, based on COMSOL finite element
simulations and SPICE circuit modeling of the experimental setup.
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2.2

Introduction

Physical unclonable functions (PUFs), using a disordered medium with unpredictable
functionality, have lately become a preferred method to provide hardware security. Conventional
PUFs, based on CMOS circuitry, rely solely on process variations, and their security is being
compromised by recent advances in model-building attack techniques [87]. As an alternative,
PUFs based on various emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) nano-devices, such as phase change
memory (PCM), are being proposed, where not only the process variations but also intrinsic
programming variability, noise, and other stochastic properties contribute to the overall
unpredictability [36]. Programming variability in NVM devices, a challenge for memory
applications, provides a physical origin of randomness for PUFs, which is impossible to predict or
model. Moreover, cycle-to-cycle programming variability and the high-endurance of these NVM
devices offer reconfigurability for these PUFs [34].
PCM relies on phase switching in a chalcogenide material (most commonly Ge 2Sb2Te5 or
GST) between the high resistance amorphous or reset state and the low resistance crystalline or set
state [47]. Both reset and set operations in PCM are prone to programming variability, especially
when applied pulse parameters fall in the intermediate range between those for a full reset and a
full set. During every reset or amorphization process, the fast quench after melting of the GST
active region leads to randomly disordered atomic structures that result in resistance variability in
both the amorphous and the subsequent crystalline state of the device, leading to both cell-to-cell
and cycle-to-cycle reset variability [58]. Utilizing this inherent reset variability in PCM, small and
light-weight PUF devices can be produced with low power requirement and high retention time
[57], [88].
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The idea of utilizing the programming variability of PCM cells for PUFs was first proposed
by Kursawe et al. [34]. In a later simulation work by Zhang et al., the security performances of a
PCM-based PUF (PCKGen - relying on a non-uniform programming approach, i.e., variable
amplitudes and durations of the programming current pulse) were evaluated [79]. Zhang et al.
presented detailed experimental validations of [79] in a following work [32], using micro-trench
PCM cells and applying voltage pulses with non-uniform approach. The authors indicated that a
non-uniform programming approach utilizes process variations and programming variability,
whereas a uniform programming approach only includes the process variations. However, it is
important to note that the intrinsic amorphization variability in PCM devices is an added feature
to the process variations and can be obtained with both non-uniform and uniform programming
approaches. Hence, not only the intrinsic programming variability of PCM devices but also the
programming pulse variability generated by the auxiliary CMOS circuits resulted the large number
of challenge response pairs (CRPs) and robust protection against physical attacks in [32].
Piccinini et al. recently simulated the intrinsic programming variability in line cells and
suggested that PCM cells optimized for memory performance are not necessarily the best choices
for hardware security applications [81]. The authors indicated that the heater in a mushroom cell
significantly suppresses programming variability by confining the active region to the same
location for each programming cycle. Planar or line cells, on the other hand, can be programmed
at different locations for different reset operations, which enhances the programming variability.
However, no device-level characterization of actual PCM cells has been performed yet, to the best
of the author’s knowledge, to study the intrinsic variability that PCM nanodevices can offer using
a uniform pulsing approach.
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In this chapter, electrical measurements on GST PCM line cells have been performed to
characterize the intrinsic variability in these devices. Single, identical reset voltage pulses with
moderate amplitude and uniform programming approach result in randomly distributed
programmed resistance levels on different cells. Various cell dimensions and programming pulse
parameters have been tested, and those that maximize the programmed resistance spread for PCMbased PUF applications have been identified. The underlying physical mechanisms for the
enhanced reset variability are explained. The reliability (upon aging) and uniqueness of such PUFs
have been tested.

2.3

Fabrication and Electrical Characterization

The tested GST line cells were 50 nm thick, on SiO2, capped by Si3N4, and had bottom tungsten
(W) contact pads with (Ti/TiN) liner, with various lengths (L ~320-680 nm) and widths (W ~130720 nm) [67]. Cells wider than ~260 nm had a rectangular shape while narrower cells had a dogbone structure; example scanning electron microscope or SEM images are shown in Figure 2-1a,b.
Initially, all GST cells were annealed in 675 K for 10 minutes at a Janis ST-500-UHT probe station
at ~1 mTorr to crystallize the cells to the stable hexagonal closed packed (hcp) state (annealing
profile in Figure 2-1c). Despite the identical annealing profile used for all cells, the initial
crystalline resistance (Rcrystalline) values varied from cell to cell due to several factors [37]:
 grain distribution variation on annealed crystalline cells [89],
 process variation in terms of thickness, length, and width of the GST line, contact resistance
variations, etc., and
 random arrangement of any voids formed during annealing process [90].
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Figure 2-1: (a, b) SEM images of a dog-bone and a rectangular GST line cell. (c) Annealing profile
for crystallization of as-deposited amorphous cells to hcp state. Cells were kept at 675 K for 10
minutes. (d) Circuit schematics of the electrical characterization set-up. 50 Ω termination resistors
were used at channel 1, 3, and 4.
Reference [89] shows finite element simulations of cycle-to-cycle crystallization and grain
distribution maps for the face centered cubic or fcc states of a mushroom cell with small active
region (~50 nm thick amorphous layer). The variability in the fcc states resistance that can arise
from the grain distribution variations was also described in reference [89]. A similar variation for
the hcp cells used here, where a much larger region (the entire cell) is annealed to the hcp, is
expected. Due to the larger area of the cell, it is likely that the hcp resistance can be significantly
higher for some cells with additional grain boundaries due to larger number of smaller grains.
The presence of small voids at random locations in the hcp cells is evident from SEM
images of 6 unprogrammed hcp cells (L/W ratio ~4) shown in Figure 2-2.
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Figure 2-2: SEM images of annealed hcp unmeasured cells of L = 420-440 nm and W = ~100-130
nm. (a-e) Examples of 5 cells with noticeable voids marked with red circles, (f) an example of a
cell without any noticeable void.
Due to the variability present at the initial Rcrystalline, the use of voltage pulses, instead of
current pulses, for programming introduced additional intrinsic variability, since different cells
experienced different current levels even though the same voltage amplitude was applied (Vapplied
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or Vch1). Single voltage pulses of 200 ns duration (tduration) were used for programming all cells. An
arbitrary function generator (Tektronix AFG 3102) was used to generate the programming pulses
and a digital oscilloscope (Tektronix DPO 4104) to measure Vch1 and voltage at channel 3 and 4
(Vch4). The GST cells were electrically characterized in a room temperature probe set-up. A
semiconductor parameter analyzer (Agilent 4156C) was used for the read operations (DC sweep
from -0.1 to +0.1 V) at any programmed resistance (Rprogrammed) of the GST cells. A relay circuit,
controlled with an Arduino Mega 2560 card, was used to automatically switch between the reading
and programming operations. A load resistor of 5.1 kΩ was used to limit the current through the
cells during programming (Figure 2-1d).
Two pulse shapes were tested, with shorter and longer pulse edges, by setting both the rise
and fall times of the applied voltage pulses (trise = tfall = tedge) to 0 or 20 ns in the function generator.
Due to the resolution of the function generator and loading effects, the output voltage pulses had
the measured edges of ~25 and ~35 ns and the resulting current pulses had edges of ~10 and ~22
ns. These are referred as ‘short tedge’ and ‘long tedge’ pulses for the rest of the chapter.

2.4

Results

2.4.1 Effect of Cell Dimensions on Programming Variability
The moderate values of Vapplied that can generate a wide spread of Rprogrammed are important to be
identified. Thus, studying whether Rprogrammed increases gradually or abruptly with small
increments of Vapplied on different cells helps narrowing down the Vapplied range to be used for PUFs.
Moreover, the trends of Rprogrammed versus Vapplied on cells of different dimensions help us choose
the right cell dimensions for PUFs. To examine the effects of length, width, and aspect ratio of
51

GST line cells on programming variability, 9 groups of different dimension GST cells were used,
with at least 20 cells of similar dimensions within each group. Each cell was programmed
individually with a single programming voltage pulse (with different Vapplied for each group to
cover the range from always unsuccessful reset to always successful reset).
Figure 2-3 shows the resulting Rprogrammed (red spheres) as a function of Vapplied, along with
the corresponding initial Rcrystalline (blue stars) for each of the 9 groups of cells. Each of the single
applied pulses in Figure 2-3 had a tduration of 200 ns and short tedge. The 9 groups of cells with
similar dimensions are combinations of 3 width groups (W ~100-130, ~260-300, and ~680-720
nm) and 3 length groups (L ~340, ~460, and ~660 nm). The cells with larger length-to-width ratios
(L/W ≥ 1.8) (Figure 2-3a-c,e,f) show abrupt changes in the Rprogrammed versus Vapplied plot
(highlighted with green boxes); after a certain Vapplied, the cells were either fully reset (with
Rprogrammed > ~107 Ω: high resistance states or HRS) or partially/barely reset (Rprogrammed > ~102-5
Ω: low resistance states or LRS) randomly. There is a clear distinction between the HRS and LRS
and it is difficult to achieve intermediate states in these long-narrow cell geometries, possibly due
to the effective conduction blockage by a single amorphized volume (Figure 2-4a). The cells with
smaller L/W (0.4 – 1.3), on the other hand, show comparatively smoother increase of Rprogrammed
values on different cells with increasing values of Vapplied (Figure 2-3d,g-i) and can be programmed
to several intermediate states between HRS and LRS, apparently by preserving continuous
conduction paths around one or more smaller amorphized volumes (Figure 2-4b).
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Figure 2-3: Programming of 9 groups of GST line cells of various dimensions with single voltage
pulses. At least 20 cells from each group experienced a single programming pulse of various Vapplied
to fully or partially amorphize from their initial crystalline states. The initial crystalline and
programmed resistance levels (Rcrystalline and Rprogrammed) are plotted as blue stars (scattered) and red
spheres (connected with red dotted line to show trend), respectively. Insets show the corresponding
SEM images of unprogrammed GST cells with the corresponding cell width and length-to-width
ratio for each cell group. The lengths of the cells were ~340 (a, d, g), ~460 (b, e, h), and ~660 nm
(c, f, i). Each programming pulse was 200 ns wide with short tedge. The green boxes in a-c, e, and
f highlight the ranges of Vapplied values that lead to random Rprogrammed on different cells, i.e. where
Rprogrammed values vary abruptly with Vapplied.
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Figure 2-4: Schematic representations of (a) continuous conduction path around one or more
amorphized volumes in a wider line cell and (b) blocked conduction path in a narrower line cell.
The high variability regions in the Rprogrammed vs. Vapplied plots (highlighted areas in Figure
2-3a-c,e,f) for cells with larger L/W ratios, where similar Vapplied can randomly lead to HRS or LRS
state with a large separation between the two states, are suitable for PUF applications. The clear
distinction between the two states avoids the need for a reference cell array, which is commonly
used in NVM-based PUFs for calculating the threshold resistance that distinguishes between HRS
and LRS when Rprogrammed is in the intermediate resistance range [91]. However, some of the cells
with the largest L/W (Figure 2-3c) broke (Rprogrammed > 1012, not shown), instead of programming
to the HRS, when Vapplied > 2 V is applied. This can be possibly due to the lithographic limitations
of long-narrow structures. When a dog-bone structure is much longer than the width (Figure 2-3c),
the middle part of the cell becomes narrower than the designed width due to some geometrydependent processes. Among the SEM images provided in the insets of Figure 2-3a-c, the design
width of all three cells are the same but the actual widths are different due to uncontrolled
lithographic limitation (widest in Figure 2-3a for the shortest cell and narrowest for Figure 2-3c
for the longest cell). Because of this phenomenon, cells with very small designed width (~40-60
nm) and length of 370-500 nm often yield open structures because of a large L/W ratio due to the
uncontrolled fabrication processes [92]. Therefore, some cells at Figure 2-3c often cannot
withstand the voltage of 2 V and break. Hence, among 9 cell dimensions, the cells in Figure 2-3b
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(L/W ~4) are identified as the most useful ones for PUF applications and are used for the PUF test
(in part 2.4.3 in page 59).

2.4.2 Effect of tedge on Programming Variability
To test the effect of tedge of the applied reset pulse on the amorphization process, another study was
performed, in which 10 sets of PCM cells (with 26 cells in each set, of W of ~200 to ~700 nm in
20 nm increments and of similar L of ~380 nm) experienced a single voltage pulse of same tduration
(200 ns). 5 sets of cells experienced long tedge (Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6a) and the other 5 sets had
short tedge (Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6b). Because of the same Vapplied value used in each tedge case
(6 and 3 V for long and short tedge case), the narrower cells in each set of measurement reached
HRS whereas the wider ones stayed at LRS (Figure 2-6). At the transition region of each case, the
moderately wide cells experienced a moderate reset voltage, which resulted in uncertainty of
reaching to HRS or LRS. This transition part is much broader with fewer cells programmed at the
intermediate states (~105-6 Ω) for the short tedge case (Figure 2-6b) as compared to the long tedge
case (Figure 2-6a), where a smoother transition range is defined with much less variability and
with some cells programmed at intermediate states. Hence, long tedge enables more controlled
programming, whereas short tedge enhances the uncertainty of reset, with the latter desired for
PUFs.

55

Figure 2-5: An example of (a) applied programming voltage pulse at channel 1 (Vapplied or Vch1)
and (b) measured voltage at channel 3, 4 (Vch4) as a function of time, with long (gray dashed line)
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and short (blue solid line) pulse edges (tedge) to program to ~15 MΩ in two cells (L/W: 380/460
and 400/360 nm). These waveforms are inputted in the SPICE circuit modeling and COMSOL
finite element simulations to compute the (c) cell voltage (Vcell), (d) cell current (Icell), and (e)
temperature profile at the center of the cell (Tcell) with 5 peaks marked as p1-p5 and 5 quenching
instances marked as q1-q5 after each melt. The SPICE simulations are performed for both long and
short tedge cases and the COMSOL is run only for the short tedge case (Navy-blue dotted line).

Figure 2-6: Programmed resistance Rprogrammed as a function of cell width. Single pulse of 200 ns
duration was applied with (a) 6 V amplitude and long pulse edge (tedge) and (b) 3 V amplitude with
short tedge. (c-h) Example SEM images of approximately 380 nm long and 200, 300, 400, 500, 600,
and 700 nm wide GST line cells.
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Figure 2-7: 2-dimensional phase distribution maps extracted from finite element simulations for a
line cell with L/W of 400/360 nm and for the short tedge case. Left to right: elapsed time during the
applied pulse. (a) at the beginning (0 ns) and (b-f) during quenching instances marked as q1 – q5
in Figure 2-5e. Light pink, maroon, and white colors refer to the amorphous, crystalline, and grain
boundary regions, respectively. The electrode at the upper side has positive polarity.
Our experimental setup circuitry was modeled in SPICE by including all parasitic
capacitances and inputting the measured Vch1 and Vch4 for the two examples shown in Figure 2-5a,b
for the long and short tedge cases, respectively. It was observed that the cell current (Icell) mostly
flows during the pulse edges of Vch1 for both cases. The sharp edges present in Icell for the short
tedge case (Figure 2-5d solid blue line), due to the additional capacitive current overshoot, are
responsible for the faster melting and quenching, the associated stronger variability, and the ability
to reset with lower Vapplied. An identical GST cell that was used for the short tedge case in Figure
2-5a,b was also simulated with a nucleation and growth based finite element model [89], [93] using
COMSOL Multiphysics. For computational efficiency, simplified waveforms resembling
measured Vch1 and Vch4, but with continuous first derivatives, were inputted and additional circuit
elements were simulated with a SPICE node. Higher amplitude for Icell was observed from
COMSOL as compared to that from SPICE (Figure 2-5d), which indicates additional contribution
of thermal runaway at the onset of melting [94]. The cell temperature (Tcell) contains five sharp
peaks p1 to p5 (Figure 2-5e). At each peak, melting occurred at random locations, and the following
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quenched material showed distinct phase distribution maps after each peak (Figure 2-7),
supporting the intrinsic programming variability feature of PCM.

2.4.3 Reset PUF Test
Based on the observations of high reset variability with long-narrow cells and shorter tedge of the
applied programming pulse, a reset PUF test was conducted with 85 GST line cells with L/W ratio
of 4 (L ~460 and W ~130 nm) and a single voltage pulse with pre-calibrated Vapplied of 1.5 V
(estimated from the highlighted region of Rprogrammed versus Vapplied plot at Figure 2-3b), tduration of
200 ns, and short tedge. Among the 85 annealed cells, around 90% appear to be in hcp state, with
resistance < 1 kΩ and the rest might be either in mixed hcp-fcc states or in hcp states with voids
or additional grain boundaries due to larger number of smaller grains leading to higher resistances
[89]. After programming, the resistance spread (Figure 2-8) shows a distribution of ~50% cells in
the HRS and ~50% cells in LRS with ~1.5 order of magnitude gap between the two states. Because
of the high endurance of PCM devices and the cycle-to-cycle variability, the same cell can be used
for a practically unlimited number of times (~1012) [51] with new, unpredictable refreshed set of
CRPs.
As GST experiences resistance drift in amorphous and fcc states [64], [65], these 85 cells
were re-measured after 9 months during which all cells were kept at room temperature. It was
observed that the cells at HRS state had gone to even higher resistance values due to strong upward
resistance drift at HRS and the ones at LRS had drifted to lower resistance values due to
crystallization from the various mixed-amorphous-crystalline states. No bit flipping was observed
at all and an even safer separation of ~3 orders of magnitude between the HRS and LRS states was
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observed after 9 months (black circles in Figure 2-8). This ensures the reproducibility of generating
the same response when interrogating an aged PCM-PUF device with the same challenge.

Figure 2-8: (a) Initial crystalline (Rcrystalline) and (b) programmed resistance (Rprogrammed)
distributions of 85 long-narrow (~460 nm long and ~130 nm wide) GST cells after ~10 seconds
(red spheres) and ~9 months (black circles) of programming operation. Single voltage pulse of 1.5
V amplitude, pulse width of 200 ns, and short pulse edge was used for programming each cell.

2.5

Circuit-Level Modeling of Reset Operation

The experimental setup used in this chapter includes some parasitic capacitances, which
significantly contribute to the observed phase change dynamics. This section explains these
contributions using SPICE simulations of the approximate circuit model. The evolution of the
60

phase distribution map inside the cell is simulated with finite element model using COMSOL
Multiphysics.

Figure 2-9: (a) Approximate circuit model schematic of the experimental setup with the measured
parasitic capacitance and resistance values. (b) Simplified circuit model simulated in SPICE with
the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4 waveforms. (c) Modeling of GST resistance switching with three
switches in SPICE.
Figure 2-9a illustrates the approximate circuit model of the experimental setup (shown in
Figure 2-1d) with the following components:
1. Channel 1 termination resistance, Rch1 = 50 Ω.
2. Capacitance of coaxial cable to channel 1 termination, Cch1 = 110 pF.
3. Cell resistance, Rcell: values used for SPICE simulations are listed in Table 2-1.
4. Capacitance of probe arm to load resistor, Cload = 20 pF.
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5. Load resistance, Rload = 5.1 kΩ.
6. Channel 3 and 4 termination resistance in parallel, Rch3,4 = 50 || 50 Ω = 25 Ω.
7. Capacitance of coaxial cable to channel 3 and 4 terminations, Cch3,4 = 110 pF.

Figure 2-10: GST resistivity change as a function of temperature, measured data on 100 nm GST
thin film (re-plotted from reference [94]). Inset shows an expanded view of the resistivity drop
during melting.
Table 2-1: Cell resistance Rcell used in SPICE simulation.

Rcell

Rcrystalline
(Ω)

Rmolten (Ω)

Ramorphous (MΩ):
measured at 10 s

Short tedge

165

140

14.70

Long tedge

220

140

14.95
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Ramorphous (MΩ):
used in simulations
1.70
1.73

To closely simulate the experimental non-ideal conditions, the measured voltage
waveforms for channel 1, Vch1 and channel 3 and 4, Vch3,4 (= Vch3 = Vch4) are inputted for the long
and short pulse edges (tedge) that are presented in Figure 2-5. Figure 2-9b shows the simplified
circuit model, in which the parasitic capacitances and termination resistances for both channel 1
and channel 3,4 are already taken into account in the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4. Rcell is switched
between the measured hexagonal close packed (hcp) crystalline resistance Rcrystalline, a molten
resistance Rmolten of 140 Ω, and the measured amorphous resistance Ramorphous values (Figure 2-9c)
for the two cells related to Figure 2-5. Table 2-1 lists these different resistances used for the circuit
simulations. The Rmolten value is assumed to be 140 Ω for all simulations, which is slightly less
than the hcp Rcrystalline, since melting incorporates a drop in the GST resistivity (as shown in Figure
2-10 inset) [94]. Since the measured amorphous cells drifted upward about ~1 order of magnitude
at room temperature for 10 seconds after being programmed, before the resistance was measured,
instantaneous programmed resistance values are inputted in the simulations instead. The
instantaneous programmed resistance is calculated at 30 ns after amorphization, which is the
earliest reported elapsed time for resistance drift [58]. The drift coefficient is taken as 0.11 [65].
Melting and amorphization of GST cell is simulated with three switches S1, S2, and S3 that
sequentially turn on and off to include the appropriate Rcell (Figure 2-9c). For both the short and
long tedge cases, the melting is assumed to take place during the rising edge of the Vch1 and the
amorphization is assumed to take place after the falling edge of Vch1. At the starting of the
simulation, S1 is closed while S2 and S3 are kept open to use Rcrystalline as the starting Rcell. During
melting, Rcell is switched from Rcrystalline to Rmolten by opening S1 and closing S2, while keeping S3
open. For amorphization, Rcell is switched from Rmolten to Ramorphous by opening S2 and closing S3,
while keeping S1 open.
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The measured waveforms presented in Figure 2-5a,b only show Vch1 and the current
through the channel 3,4 termination,

Ω

. To understand the phase change dynamics in the GST

cell due to transient behaviors, it is necessary to compute the resulting cell voltage and current,
Vcell and Icell, respectively. Therefore, the voltage at the two ends of the cell Vch1 and Vinternal, Vch3,4,
Vcell = (Vch1 - Vinternal), and Icell are monitored in the circuit simulations.
It is observed from the simulations that even though the amplitudes of Vch1 and Vch3,4 are
half for the short tedge case as compared to those for the long tedge case (Figure 2-11a,b), the Vcell
amplitudes are very similar for the two cases (Figure 2-11c). For both the short and long tedge cases,
the Vcell includes voltage drops during each of the Vch1 transitions, that are in opposite polarity
(Figure 2-11c). As a result, Icell flows in one direction during the rising edge of Vch1 and in the
opposite direction during the falling edge of Vch1 (Figure 2-11d) for both the short and long tedge
cases.
For a clearer view of the pulse transition edges of Figure 2-11 (highlighted in green and
pink boxes in Figure 2-11), these transition periods are expanded in Figure 2-12. Icell for the short
tedge case consists of a very sharp triangular current pulse (of ~15 ns duration and ~8.4 mA
amplitude) at each of the pulse edge of the Vch1 (Figure 2-12d). On the other hand, the Icell for the
long tedge case consists of a slower and wider triangular pulse (of ~53 ns duration and ~6.7 mA
amplitude) at each of the pulse edges of Vch1 (Figure 2-12d). The triangular current pulse edges of
Icell for the short tedge case are denoted as srise(1), sfall(1), srise(2), and sfall(2); and the triangular current
pulse edges of Icell for the long tedge case are denoted as lrise(1), lfall(1), lrise(2), and lfall(2) (Figure 2-11).
The sharper edges with slightly larger amplitude for Icell in the short tedge case (srise(1), sfall(1), srise(2),
and sfall(2)) can be attributed to the additional capacitive current contributions, which also indicates
faster Joule heating in the cell and earlier melting during srise(1).
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The simulation results also show that the different Vch1 amplitudes of 6 and 3 V for the long
and short tedge cases, respectively, result in comparable Icell amplitudes, which produce enough
Joule heating to induce melting in both cells. Beside the additional capacitive current in the short
tedge case, there can also be added thermal runaway, which can further increase Icell. In case of the
starting hcp state as the low resistance state or LRS (as the experimental condition used here), the
effect of thermal runaway is expected to be less, since the hcp resistivity increases slightly with
temperature and starts to decrease only near melting (Figure 2-10 inset) [94]. Hence, the smaller
voltage required for reset for the short tedge case in these experiments should be mostly because of
the additional capacitive currents originating from the experimental setup circuit. However, in case
of an fcc phase as starting LRS, which is the more practical and common LRS, the significant
decrease of resistivity with temperature (Figure 2-10) would lead to a thermal runaway and earlier
melting. In that case, the voltage amplitude required for amorphization with short tedge is expected
to reduce even further. Reference [95] describes RESET simulations in which the starting LRS
state is fcc and the effect of different rise times of the reset pulse on the amorphization profile is
very significant.
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Figure 2-11: Simulated cell voltage and current for long (dotted black line) and short (solid blue
line) tedge cases in SPICE.
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Figure 2-12: Expanded view of the rise and fall transitions of Vch1. Simulated cell voltage and
current for long (dotted black line) and short (solid blue line) tedge cases using SPICE.
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Figure 2-13: Measured voltage waveforms at channel 1 (Vch1, top row) and measured current at
channel 3 and 4 terminations (

,

Ω

, bottom row) for different tedge cases and for different cell

dimensions - two wide and two narrow cells. The black dotted lines and blue solid lines represent
the long and short tedge cases, respectively. The left and right columns show the measurements for
the wide and narrow cells, respectively. It appears that amorphization for the narrow cell with short
tedge case occurred earlier than for the other three examples.
Moreover, the very sharp srise(1), sfall(1), srise(2), and sfall(2) can lead to quick rise and fall of
the cell temperature, which may contribute to the increased programming variability. On the other
hand, the longer and more steady lrise(1), lfall(1), lrise(2), and lfall(2) can lead to more uniform melting
and slower quenching and the resulting slow rise and fall of cell temperature are expected to lead
to the more deterministic programming. The evolution of the cell temperature is simulated in the
next section using finite element modelling.
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Before that, another important point needs to be considered. The sharp sfall(1) edge (Figure
2-12d) is related to the kink present in the rising edge of Vch1 pulse for this case (Figure 2-12a),
which is defined as krise and can be ascribed to the non-ideal features and resolution of the function
generating unit. The resulting sharp sfall(1) can initiate quenching during this krise of Vch1 for some
cells, especially the narrow cells with the dog-bone structure. Results from these experiments
(Figure 2-13) show that the current measured through the termination resistors at channel 3 and 4
(

,

Ω

) for the short tedge case for narrow cells (Figure 2-13– right, blue solid line) consistently

decayed slowly during krise of Vch1, indicating a possible early quenching instance for these cells.
This suggests that the initial heating spike, during the very short rise time (of ~5 ns) of srise(1) is
sufficient to fully melt the narrow cells with the short tedge case, so that the conduction path is
blocked after amorphization; and eventually these narrow cells are expected to quench early during
the sfall(1). On the other hand, the similar srise(1) edge in a wide cell, or the lrise(1) edges in a wide or
narrow cell does not result in sufficient heating for melting fully and, rather, leads to late quenching
during the sfall(2), which occurs during the kink at the falling edge of Vch1 (marked as kfall in Figure
2-12a).
To compute the Vcell and Icell during this early quenching instance in the narrow cells with
the short tedge case, the circuit model of Figure 2-9b is simulated, in which the amorphization takes
place during the kink krise of Vch1 (Figure 2-14). Interestingly, the computed Vcell waveform in this
case (Figure 2-14c) look remarkably different than that computed in Figure 2-11c. In this case, the
Icell mostly flows in one direction with the sharp triangular pulse with edges srise(1) and sfall(1) only;
and the current amplitude through the cell in the opposite direction is comparatively very low due
to the early quenching event (Figure 2-14d and expanded view in Figure 2-14h).
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Figure 2-14: Simulated cell voltage and current for short tedge case with early quenching (during
the rising kink krise of Vch1) in SPICE. The highlighted green region of (a-d) is expanded in (e-h).
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2.6

Finite Element Modeling of Reset Operation

In order to extract the temperature evolutions in the cell and gain more insight about the phase
change dynamics in GST, a nucleation and growth based electrothermal finite element simulation
of a 2-D GST structure, that mimics the measured cell (shown in Figure 2-15), is performed.
Additional circuit elements (shown in Figure 2-9b) are also included and simulated with a SPICE
node. The finite element model used here is described in detail in references [89], [93], [96]. The
simulation was performed only for the short tedge case using the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4 (Figure
2-5a,b with solid blue line). For computational efficiency, the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4 waveforms
are smoothed to achieve continuous first derivatives. These smoothed waveforms are needed for
convergence of the electrothermal simulations.

Figure 2-15: 2-D GST device structure used for finite element simulation.
The simulated Vcell and Icell in COMSOL agree well with those simulated in SPICE (Figure
2-16c,d). The Icell computed in COMSOL has larger amplitude than that computed in SPICE; the
first peak of Icell is 14.2 mA in COMSOL and 8.4 mA in SPICE simulation; the second peak is
24.1 mA in COMSOL and only 3.6 mA in SPICE (Figure 2-16d). This difference can be ascribed
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to the additional thermal runaway in GST at the onset of melting, which is ignored in SPICE
simulation.
Several sharp peaks are observed in the cell temperature Tcell during the Vch1 transitions
(Figure 2-16e, peaks p1, p2, p3, p4, and p5). The cell experiences melting at each of these peaks.
Figure 2-17 to Figure 2-21 show the evolution of the phase distribution maps of the GST cell
during each of these peaks. In the phase distribution maps, ‘light pink’ represents the amorphous,
‘magenta’ the molten, ‘maroon’ the crystalline, and ‘white’ the grain boundary regions. It is
interesting to note that the shapes and locations of the molten regions in the GST cell are unique
for each of the melting events. The amorphous volumes formed after each quenching are also
remarkably distinct (Figure 2-17 to Figure 2-21f). These unique shapes and random locations of
the molten regions observed during different melting events of the same reset operation in the same
cell point to the origins for reset variability observed in cell to cell or cycle to cycle operations in
PCM cells. A room-temperature read operation is performed in COMSOL after applying the pulse
and the computed final resistance is 1.85 MΩ, which is very close to the calculated instantaneous
programmed resistance of 1.73 MΩ.
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Figure 2-16: (a) Cell voltage Vcell, (b) current Icell, and (c) temperature Tcell simulated in COMSOL
for the short tedge case (royal blue dotted line) at the center point of the GST cell. Vcell and Icell for
the short tedge case simulated in SPICE are also plotted as solid blue line in (a) and (b), respectively.
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Figure 2-17: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p1.

Figure 2-18: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p2.

Figure 2-19: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p3.

Figure 2-20: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p4.
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Figure 2-21: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p5.

2.7

Discussion

2.7.1 Advantages of This Work
PUFs based on programming variability or any intrinsic variability related to the device structure
or materials property are expected to be more secure than PUFs based on process variations only.
With physical attacks or model-building attacks, a PUF can be replicated if it relies on process
variations only (including the PUFs relying on device delay mismatch). The programming
variability in PCM occurs in a truly stochastic and unpredictable way, which is impossible to
model. The contributions of the work presented in this chapter to the PCM-based hardware security
field are:
i.

Uniform programming approach: Zhang et al. showed an excellent work on the firsttime implementation of a PCM-based PUF [32]. However, as mentioned in section 1.3.3.3
in page 36, a non-uniform pulsing approach is utilized in reference [32], where different
pulse amplitudes and durations are applied to achieve variable programmed resistances.
Zhang et al. indicated that a uniform approach would only include process variations,
which might not be sufficient for PUF applications. However, the intrinsic programming
variability in PCM comes in addition to any process variations which is why PCM shows
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cycle-to-cycle variability for programming of same cell with the same pulse. The overall
variability in reference [32] was not only the result of the inherent variability of PCM but
also of the auxiliary CMOS circuitry that generated the variable pulse parameters. In this
chapter, it has been shown that a uniform approach (i.e. the same pulse parameters) still
results in significantly different programmed resistances, indicating that the intrinsic
programming variability in PCM is strong enough to be used for hardware security.
ii.

Cell design: PCM achieved technological maturity as a storage device and is recently being
used in the intel cross-point memory technology. These advances in PCM for storage and
memory devices included suppression of variability with new materials and cell designs.
Hence, the micro-trench, dash-type, or pore cells – that are excellent for consistent
operation for storage and memory devices – are not ideal for hardware security
applications, which require significant variability. Piccinini et al. also discussed this choice
of cell designs for hardware security [81]. Zhang et. al used micro-trench cells [32], which
is a good geometry for storage and memory application. In this chapter, line cells are used,
which are not as good as micro-trench cells for memory applications due to increased
variability. It is shown in this chapter how cell dimensions (aspect ratio in line cells) and
pulsing parameters can result in suitable variability with uniform pulsing approach for
PUFs.

iii.

Device-level characterization: Piccinini et al. showed interesting simulation results on
PCM-based true random number generator (TRNG) [81]. One concern for hardware
security research is that the actual variability of real devices needs to be characterized by
device-level measurements. Gao et al. points out this concern very clearly in reference [36].
However, all papers on device-level characterization of PCM focus on how the variability
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can be reduced, and the devices can be successfully used for memory. In this chapter,
device-level characterization of PCM devices is performed to show how the intrinsic
variability in these devices can be increased by certain cell dimensions and pulsing
parameters. These results show that longer and narrower cells with shorter pulse edges lead
to significant programming variability.
iv.

Physical mechanism: As the recent trend in the hardware security field requires variability
originating from the physics of nanodevices, it is crucial to understand the underlying
mechanisms in these devices’ operation dynamics. In this work, several ways of enhancing
programming variability in PCM-based PUF operation are presented that are linked to the
PCM device physics, such as:
 continuous conduction path vs blocked conduction path (Figure 2-4), which indicates
the possible reason for achieving less controlled programming in the narrow dog-bone
cells and
 the effect of rise and fall times of the applied voltage pulse on the programming
dynamics.
Moreover, stable PUF responses with distinguishable HRS and LRS after 9 months are
shown in this work, which is the result of resistance drift in PCM, another physical
phenomenon.

2.7.2 Limitations of This Work
This work shows that the choice of cell used for hardware security applications must be determined
by considering the features necessary for a given security primitive. Hence, the traditional goodperformance cells for memory and storage applications are not necessarily the best ones for
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security, where increasing the variability, not suppressing it, is a key requirement. Line cells are
expected to lead to greater variability due to the random location of amorphization compared to
mushroom cells. But line cells are also not good in all respects; for example, line cells are more
difficult to cycle and show lower endurance, an essential parameter for a reconfigurable PUF. Line
cells are used in this work because of the accessibility to only this cell type. Further efforts in the
hardware security field can include the design of cells that show good variability and endurance
along with other essential memory and security features, depending on the specific application.
The overhead circuitry in this work (from the experimental setup parasitic), which
enhances programming variability, would only require the integration of pulse generators with an
appropriate capacitive network. Even though no additional CMOS-based auxiliary circuitry is
required to produce variable pulse amplitude and durations, as shown in Zhang’s PCM-PUF paper,
the capacitors would require a significant area in the IC.

2.7.3 Security Performance Analysis of This Work
A color map of the measured 85 cells was presented in section 2.4.3 in page 59 with very similar
dimensions to show the randomness of programming to either 0 (HRS) or 1 (LRS). The measured
cells were located at 5 dies (referred as die 1 to 5 in Figure 2-22).
Total measured devices: 85 (excluding the 5 N/A devices).
Number of cells programmed to 0 (HRS): 41 (48.2 %).
Number of cells programmed to 1 (LRS): 44 (51.8 %).
N/A refers to cells that were not used for this experiment.
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Figure 2-22: A color map of the measured cells with very similar dimensions (widths of 100-130
nm and lengths of ~420-440 nm) shows the randomness of programming to either 0 (HRS) or 1
(LRS).
An NIST 800-22 statistical test suite was run. For this test, a binary bit sequence was
created taking the 0’s and 1’s as shown in the above map. The bits were taken in a row-by row
fashion, i.e., first, all the bits in row 1 of Figure 2-22 were taken and then the bits from to row 2
were taken, and so on. Then, the bit sequence was divided in 4 segments: each of 21 bits long. So,
total 84 bits were used, and the last bit was discarded. All 4 sequences passed the frequency, block
frequency, cumulative sums, and runs tests. The report on the test result is shown below:
Table 2-2: NIST statistical test suite 800-22 results on the 85 measured data.
C1

C2

C3

C4

C5

C6

C7

C8

C9 C10

P-VALUE

PROPORTION

STATISTICAL TEST

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------0

2

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

----

4/4

Frequency

0

2

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

----

4/4

BlockFrequency

1

1

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

----

4/4

CumulativeSums

0

2

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

----

4/4

CumulativeSums

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

----

4/4

Runs

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

----

0/4

*

LongestRun

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

----

0/4

*

Rank
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To run this test completely, at least 1 million cells need to be measured, since the number
of bits needed for the test corresponds to the number of measured/programmed cells in this case.
Programming that large number of cells is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of an academic setting
(with manual probe stations). At least, 100 bits are required even for a basic test and a minimum
of 10 sequences are required to calculate the p-values. Hence, due to lack of enough bits, the pvalues were not achieved, and the test could not be completed. In this chapter, device-level results
are provided, instead, for the proof-of-concept.

2.7.4 Comparisons with Other Works
Piccinini et al. shows an interesting simulation of crystallization variability in a PCM cell array
with a random network model [97]. Based on the simulation results, they generated 300 sequences,
each of 16-bit long. Their NIST 800-22 statistical test result was as follows:
Table 2-3: NIST 800-22 statistical test results of Piccinini et al. [97].
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In this chapter, 4 sequences of bits received from the experimental results, each of 21 bits
long, were generated. All sequences passed the frequency, block frequency, cumulative sums
(forward and reverse), and the runs tests. However, all sequences failed in the longest runs and
rank tests due to a lack of sufficient bits. Even though this data set is small, it shows actual
measurements as compared to the simulation-based results in [97].
Table 2-4: NIST 800-22 statistical test results of the experimental data measured on 85 cells
(shown in section 2.4.3 in page 59).
Test Name

Failure rate

Result

Frequency

0%

Pass

Block frequency

0%

Pass

Cumulative sums (forward)

0%

Pass

Cumulative sums (reverse)

0%

Pass

Runs

0%

Pass

LongestRun

100%

Fail

Rank

100%

Fail

Yu et al. presented a ring oscillator (RO) PUF, which requires error correction circuitry
and thus consumes extra area overhead [98]. The results presented in this chapter (section 2.4.3)
show very stable PUF responses, that are easily distinguishable; the reliability is further improved
upon aging because of the resistance drift of these PCM cells (illustrated in Figure 2-8). Hence, an
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error correction circuitry would not be required in this case. Moreover, reference [98] is based on
a CMOS-based PUF, which only relies on process variations. Hence, it is worth investigating new
non-volatile memory-based PUFs, in which the programming variability is an added useful feature
and the cycle-to-cycle programming variability and high endurance can result in reconfigurable
PUFs.

2.8

Conclusion

The unique structures formed during the melt-quench amorphization in PCM provide good cellto-cell and cycle-to-cycle variability for refreshable sets of challenge-response pairs for
reconfigurable PUFs. The effects of cell dimensions and pulsing parameters on reset variability
are experimentally characterized in GST-based PCM line cells for PUF applications. Cells with
higher length-to-width ratio show higher reset variability when moderate amplitude single voltage
pulses are applied with short pulse edges. Due to effective conduction blockage with single pulse
amorphization, these cells also exhibit a wide separation between the low and high resistance
states, avoiding the need for a reference cell array in a binary PUF. It has been shown that a random
and equal probability of low and high resistance states can be achieved using a pre-calibrated
programming amplitude. No bit flipping, and an even clearer distinction between the two states
were observed after 9 months at room temperature. This reset PUF test was conducted on 85 cells
of similar dimensions and large length-to-width ratio. The overall programming uncertainty in this
work originates from the complex intrinsic phase change dynamics of GST, including the transient
current overshoots during the pulse transients and the thermal runaway at the onset of melting.
The evolutions of the cell voltage, current, temperature, and the phase distribution maps
are evaluated by modeling the experimental circuitry in SPICE and performing finite element
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simulations in COMSOL inputting the measured waveforms. It has been observed that the
capacitive current overshoot, due to the parasitic capacitances present in the experimental setup,
is significantly stronger for the short tedge case, which not only enables amorphization at a lower
applied voltage amplitude, but also introduces added amorphization uncertainty because of the
resulting faster rise and fall of the cell temperature during the transients. In addition to the
capacitive overshoot, slight thermal runaway is also expected in the measured hcp GST cell at the
onset of melting. The overall programming uncertainty in this work originates from the intrinsic
phase change dynamics of GST, which is more significant for the long-narrow cells and the short
pulse edges. In a more practical case, where the starting LRS is an fcc state, an enhancement of
the overall programming variability and a further reduction of the required reset voltage amplitude
is expected due to the thermal runaway of the fcc state, which is again an intrinsic property of GST.
PCM line cells, such as used in this chapter, are useful for characterization studies, and
show greater variability compared to confined designs such as mushroom or micro-trench cells but
suffer from worse endurance and cell area. New cell designs are needed for optimal memory
parameters and variability to reach overall suitable devices for a given hardware security
application. PCM PUFs are not suitable for high-temperature operation due to accelerated
crystallization (data loss) above ~ 105 °C [75]. Also, like most PUFs based on programming
variability of emerging non-volatile memories, PCM PUFs are weak PUFs because of the limited
number of CRPs (which can only increase linearly with the number of cells in the array). New
concepts for designs of strong PUFs with exponentially large number of CRPs and inherent
stochastic device properties are still of high interest. Nevertheless, PCM-PUFs are a promising
platform for a wide range of applications in hardware security due to large intrinsic variability,
high density, CMOS compatibility, and technology maturity.
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Chapter 3 | Enhancing Programming Variability for
Security Applications in Multi-bit PCM
3.1

Abstract

We performed gradual programming on phase change memory (PCM) line cells with repeated
pulses and analyzed the variability in programming trends for various cell dimensions. The
crystalline PCM cells experienced repeated applied voltage pulses of either identical amplitudes
or gradually increasing amplitudes. When repeated identical pulses were applied on wide
rectangular cells (width, W ~700 nm), a good agreement was observed in the programming trends
from cell to cell. Conversely, the narrow rectangular and dog-bone cells (W ~260 and ~100 nm,
respectively), experiencing identical pulses, resulted in unpredictable programming trends. The
repeated voltage pulses with increasing amplitudes gradually amorphized all cells through several
partial reset steps. Despite the same initial, final, and incremental voltage parameters inputted for
a certain dimension, variations were observed in the gradual reset pace from cell to cell. These
variations were, again, stronger for the narrow rectangular and dog-bone cells as compared to the
wide rectangular cells. The enhanced cell-to-cell programming variability in the narrower cells
resulted from stronger variations in: (i) manufacturing processes, (ii) initial crystalline resistance
spreads due to stochastic grain maps and few grain boundaries, (iii) atomic arrangement after each
full or gradual reset, (iv) spontaneous resistance drift and crystallization trends in the randomly
evolved intermediate states between consecutive pulses, and (v) spatial distributions of voids
formed due to quenching of the material from melt. The stronger variability observed in the gradual
programming trends in the narrow line cells is promising for the hardware security applications.
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3.2

Introduction

Programming variability, due to uncontrolled manufacturer variations and stochastic physical
processes inherent to the material properties or device operation principles, is a critical reliability
problem for the emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) nanodevices. Phase change memory
(PCM), one of these NVM technologies, exhibits both cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle programming
variations [58], posing serious concerns for reliable operations in memory and storage
applications. PCM is fast, dense, highly scalable, and technologically mature [99]. It relies on the
contrast of resistance values between amorphous (high resistance state or HRS) and crystalline
(low resistance state or LRS) phases of a chalcogenide material, most commonly Ge 2Sb2Te5 or
GST. The electrical switching (set and reset) operations in PCM are accomplished by applying
appropriate voltage or current pulses. The set pulse raises the cell temperature above the glass
transition temperature, but below the melting temperature, for a sufficiently long time. The reset
pulse melts a portion of the cell followed by an abrupt quenching. Therefore, reset operation
requires higher amplitude current or voltage pulse with shorter duration and sharper falling edge
as compared to the set operation [47], [48]. Due to the intrinsic variability associated with both set
and reset operations, the same programming pulse does not result in the exact same programmed
resistance from cell to cell or from cycle to cycle of the same cell [58].
Moreover, when the pulse parameters are in the mid-range of those used for a full set or
full reset operation, an uncertainty in programming to the HRS or LRS arises [100]. These
uncertain or variable programming characteristics are useful to build physical unclonable functions
(PUFs), hardware devices used for cryptographic security applications, such as authentication,
identification, and digital key generation [56], [57], [88]. Traditional microelectronic circuit based
PUFs rely solely on the process variations of CMOS fabrication technology and are prone to
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various kinds of physical and modelling attacks [6]. PUFs based on NVM nanodevices, such as
PCM, on the other hand, are gaining growing attention in the hardware security field due to the
added variations present at nanoscale and several other interesting properties [36], such as
programming variability [58], spontaneous resistance drift [64], [65], [101] and crystallization
[58], [63] and the associated stochasticity in the data loss trend [59], random telegraph signal noise
[77], 1/f fluctuations [102], and so on. These device-level random features, problems for precise
programming to the densely-spaced resistance levels for multilevel cell (MLC) memory [55] and
synaptic devices [103], [104], are greatly appreciated for cryptographic security applications.
In this chapter, the gradual phase change of GST line cells using repeated voltage pulses is
presented, where partial amorphization, partial crystallization, resistance drift, and evolving grain
distribution lead to stochastic programming trends. The variabilities observed in programming
profiles are experimentally demonstrated, and the possible physical mechanisms behind the
enhanced variability and the prospects of these features in hardware security applications are
discussed in this chapter.

3.3

Background Works and Contributions of This Work

Repeated pulsing is a commonly used technique to precisely program to the intermediate states for
MLC operation [55] and PCM-based synaptic devices [103], [104]. In this technique, intermediate
states are reached by gradual increase and decrease of programmed cell resistance by means of
partial reset and partial set operations, respectively. Owing to the uncontrolled phase change
dynamics in PCM, the gradual programming is reported to be achieved in an iterative fashion,
where a target intermediate resistance level (Rtarget) is assigned; and partial reset pulses are
continuously applied on the crystalline cells until Rtarget is attained. If the programmed resistance
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level (Rprogrammed) goes slightly higher than Rtarget, repeated partial set pulses are continuously
applied to program the cell fairly close to Rtarget. In this way, several iterations of repeated partial
reset and partial set pulses are applied to program within a pre-determined error margin around
Rtarget [55]. For both MLC and synaptic device applications, a consistent trend in the programmed
resistance profile is desired for reliable operation. For security applications, such as PUFs, on the
other hand, an uncontrolled and stochastic pattern of the gradual programming profile is useful.
Zhang et al. demonstrated PCM-based PUF with gradual programming scheme, which thwarts the
physical attack by refresh operations performed either in a certain period or after a certain number
of challenge response pairs (CRPs) are measured [32] (as described in 1.3.3.3 in page 36). The
complete implementation, security performance analyses, and the resilience toward physical
attacks are valuable contributions of reference [32]. However, no device-level measurements of
the stochastic programming patterns have been presented in reference [32]. Hence, further
understanding of the key contributing factors for programming variability and possible ways to
enhance this variability are essential measures toward the improvement of the PCM-based
hardware security field. Moreover, in reference [32], the responses are determined based on the
random number of pulses required to amorphize a cell and can potentially be revealed with side
channel attacks from the knowledge of pulsing time and energy. In this chapter, an alternative
algorithm is proposed to determine the responses with a fixed number of applied pulses to all cells.
The random programmed resistance values on different cells have been quantized to multiple states
based on pre-defined threshold resistance levels (Figure 3-1).
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Figure 3-1: Determination of responses based on the programmed resistance, Rprogrammed and predefined threshold resistance levels (for example, Rth1, Rth2, and Rth3).
In Chapter 2 (section 2.5), it has been shown that the parasitic components present in the
experimental setup and the thermal runaway of GST greatly enhance programming variability in
a binary PCM-PUF based on stochastic reset using single applied voltage pulse [100]. In this
chapter, it has also been shown how these factors influence the programming profile. The more
complex resistance drift and crystallization dynamics and the complicated programming
characteristics from the gradually evolved intermediate states are discussed based on the
experimental observations.

3.4

Devices and Experimental Setup

50 nm thick GST line cells with length, L of ~ 460 nm and widths, W of ~ 700 nm (wide
rectangular), ~260 nm (narrow rectangular), and, ~100 nm (narrow dog-bone-shaped) are
electrically characterized (scanning electron microscope or SEM images shown in Figure 3-2a-c).
The cells had bottom metal contact pads and were capped with Si 3N4 [65]. These cells were
annealed at 675 K for 10 minutes in a Janis probe station to crystallize the as-deposited cells into
the stable hexagonal close packed (hcp) phase (annealing profile shown in Figure 3-2d). Electrical
voltage pulses of 200 ns duration were applied to these hcp cells using a Tektronix arbitrary
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function generator AFG 3102. The applied voltage and resulting current waveforms were
measured using a Tektronix digital phosphor oscilloscope DPO 4104 (electrical setup shown in
Figure 3-2e). Low voltage DC sweep read operations with -0.1 to +0.1 V were performed before
and after each applied pulse (Figure 3-2f,g) using an Agilent semiconductor parameter analyzer
4156C. An Arduino Mega 2560 card connected to a computer was used to control a relay card that
switched between the pulsing and reading operations automatically (Figure 3-2e).

Figure 3-2: SEM images of (a) wide rectangular (W: ~700 nm, L: ~460 nm), (b) narrow rectangular
(W: ~260 nm, L: ~460 nm), and (c) narrow dog-bone-shaped (W: ~100 nm, L: ~460 nm) GST line
cells. (d) Annealing at 675 K for 10 minutes to reach the stable hcp state. (e) Electrical
measurement setup. Electrical measurement sequence of pulsing with (f) repeated identical
amplitudes and (g) gradually increasing amplitudes. Low voltage read operations were performed
in between applied pulses for both cases.

89

Cells were electrically characterized with two types of repeated pulsing schemes (shown
in Figure 3-2f,g). In the first scheme, repeated voltage pulses of identical amplitudes (Videntical)
were applied on all three cell dimensions (Figure 3-2f). For each cell dimension, moderate Videntical
values were chosen, that were sufficient to initiate resistance change but not high enough to
amorphize the cells completely with a single pulse. The effect of different Videntical values was
tested on all cell types. The extent of variability observed in the programming trends was
monitored when a given Videntical was repeatedly applied on various cells of each dimension. In the
next scheme, repeated pulses of gradually increasing amplitudes were applied on all three cell
types (Figure 3-2g). The same starting and ending voltage amplitudes (Vstart and Vend) were used
for a certain cell dimension. It was observed how different increments in amplitudes of consecutive
applied voltage pulses (Vstep) affect the programming trend. The span of variability was also
observed by using a given Vstep on different cells of each dimension.

3.5

Results & Discussion

3.5.1 Repeated Identical Pulses
For each cell dimension, first, the effect of various Videntical was monitored on different cells (Figure
3-3a-c) and then the variability in the programmed resistance (Rprogrammed) trend was observed by
applying a given Videntical on different cells (Figure 3-3d-f). Videntical of 2.8, 2.9, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and
3.4 V were applied on 6 individual wide rectangular cells (W: ~700 nm, L: ~460 nm). These pulses
resulted in a sudden, sharp increase of resistance due to partial reset during the first 3-4 pulses and
then a gradual resistance trimming followed due to precise partial set over the next few hundreds
of applied pulses (Figure 3-3a). The transition from partial reset to partial set occurring at the 3 rd
or 4th pulse can be ascribed to the monotonous Videntical, which became insufficient to continue the
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partial reset at the elevated resistance levels. After applying 100-400 identical pulses, resistance
trimming saturated (at ~4-20 kΩ on different cells) and instead, a precise resistance increase took
place. In some cases, the gradual resistance trimming and increase took turns a few times (for
instance, for 3.3 V in Figure 3-3a), which can be related to the equal probability of partial reset or
partial set, because of the moderate Videntical. Higher Videntical elevated the programed resistance
levels (Rprogrammed) with similar resistance evolutions. For a Videntical of 3.4 V, a stronger reset took
place on the 4th applied pulse with Rprogrammed > 107 Ω. The upward resistance drift at this
amorphous phase eventually dominated over the brief gradual resistance trimming effect.
To study the variability of Rprogrammed evolution on the wide cells, Videntical of 3.2 V was
applied on 5 wide rectangular cells. Slightly different maximum resistance values (varying from
21 kΩ to 147 kΩ and obtained on the 4th or 5th pulse) and slightly different Rprogrammed evolutions
were observed (Figure 3-3d). This slight variation can be attributed to the combined effect of the
reset and set variability associated with each applied pulse and the variability in spontaneous
resistance drift taking place in between the consecutive pulses. The overall Rprogrammed evolution
was still predictable with very small degree of variability for all wide rectangular cells.
On the other hand, the narrow rectangular cells (W: ~260 nm, L: ~460 nm) showed
significant variability on the Rprogrammed evolutions, possibly due to amplified process variations,
stronger programming sensitivity, and resistance drift variations as compared to those for the wide
rectangular cells. These cells demonstrated a higher tendency to amorphize to the high resistance
state above ~107 Ω at an uncertain number of applied pulse and at this amorphous phase, the
upward resistance drift dominated over the pulsing effects. The tendency of amorphizing
drastically to the amorphous phase without going through several intermediate states can be
attributed to the easier conduction blockage property of a narrow cell as compared to the
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percolation-oriented conduction in a wide cell [100]. 7 narrow rectangular cells experienced
Videntical of 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 V and the resulting Rprogrammed evolutions showed no
predictive pattern or dependence on Videntical (Figure 3-3b). Whereas Videntical of 1.8 V amorphized
one cell after 27 applied pulses to ~42 MΩ, Videntical of 2.3 V could not raise the resistance of
another cell above 10 kΩ with 317 applied pulses.

Figure 3-3: Measured cell resistance as a function of the applied pulse numbers while
programming with 200 ns duration repeated identical amplitude pulses on (a, d) wide rectangular
(W: ~700 nm, L: ~460 nm), (b, e) narrow rectangular (W: ~260 nm, L: ~460 nm), and (c, f) narrow
dog-bone (W: ~100 nm, L: ~460 nm) GST line cells. The identical pulse amplitudes (Videntical) in
each case are as indicated in the legends.
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The reason behind the lack of a predictable trend was clearer when the same Videntical of 2.2
V was applied on 6 other narrow rectangular cells and very random Rprogrammed evolutions were
observed (Figure 3-3e). This indicates that the programming variability in these cells is so large
that the effect of different Videntical values is barely noticeable. The narrow dog-bone-shaped cells
(W: ~100 nm, L: ~460 nm) also showed similar uncertainty in Rprogrammed evolutions and similar
tendency of amorphizing above 107 Ω at an uncertain number of applied pulses (Figure 3-3e,f).
These chaotic trends observed in the Rprogrammed evolutions for both types of narrow cells (Figure
3-3b,c,e,f) show promise to the PUF applications.
However, the very chaotic programming trends of this approach might not always result in
an equal distribution of all states in an array of cells after a certain number of applied pulses, which
is an essential metric for PUFs. Instead, a less chaotic but still unpredictable programming scheme
presented next can build PUFs with less power requirement, less programming time, and more
equal state distributions, i.e. improved PUF uniqueness.

3.5.2 Repeated Pulsing with Increasing Amplitude
Whereas the identical pulse amplitudes were found to gradually program the cells randomly in the
partial reset and partial set regimes, the gradually increasing amplitude pulses were ideally
expected to only program in the partial reset regime monotonously. Literature shows experimental
[105] and simulation-based [32] results from micro-trench PCM cells, where smaller Vstep resulted
in smoother and slower resistance increase through finer partial reset. However, the measurements
with gradually increasing amplitudes on the stand-alone GST line cells in this section showed
erratic sudden amorphization in the gradual reset process, due to the additional capacitive current
originating from the parasitic components in the experimental setup. Moreover, the significant
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thermal runaway at the amorphized volumes and the face-centered cubic or fcc crystalline regions
randomly located along the line cells in the evolved intermediate states can also contribute to this
enhanced programming variability [100].

Figure 3-4: Measured cell resistance as a function of the applied pulse amplitudes while
programming with 200 ns duration, gradually increasing amplitude pulses on (a, d) wide
rectangular (W: ~700 nm, L: ~460 nm, Vstart = 2 V, Vend = 7 V), (b, e) narrow rectangular (W: ~260
nm, L: ~460 nm, Vstart = 1.8 V, Vend ≤ 2.6 V), and (c, f) narrow dog-bone (W: ~100 nm, L: ~460
nm, Vstart = 1.2 V, Vend ≥ 1.5 V) GST line cells. The step increment in amplitude in between
consecutive iterations (Vstep) in each case is indicated in the legend.
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For the wide rectangular cells, Vstart of 2 V and Vend of 7 V were used, and Vstep of 0.01,
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, and 1 V were applied. The larger Vstep programmed the wide rectangular cell
more drastically as compared to the smaller Vstep inputs (Figure 3-4a). The cell was programmed
to ~2 kΩ, ~8 kΩ, ~227 kΩ, and 17 MΩ with the largest Vstep of 1 V but many intermediate
resistance levels were more easily reachable with the smaller Vstep inputs. Moreover, the cell
eventually broke at the last step of the largest Vstep case, due to excess void formation during the
recurrent abrupt reset processes, which was not observed in the smaller Vstep cases. Smaller Vstep
cases incorporated some slight partial set operations on some steps but the overall programming
was still in the gradual reset direction (Figure 3-4a). To test the variability in the programming
trends with this pulsing scheme on these wide cells, the same Vstart of 2 V, Vend of 7 V, and Vstep of
0.2 V were applied on 20 wide rectangular cells, and very little spread was observed (Figure 3-4d).
For the narrow rectangular and dog-bone cells, on the other hand, no trend was observed
when different Vstep values were applied (Figure 3-4b,c) and the underlying cause was even clearer
when the same Vstep values were applied on 20 cells of each dimension and very broad spread was
observed in the programming trends (Figure 3-4c,f).
The statistics of the progressive Rprogrammed values on these 20 cells of each dimension was
quantitively measured and shown in Figure 3-5. At first, the minimum and maximum of the
Rprogrammed values after each applied pulse were illustrated with the symbol ✳ at the first row of
Figure 3-5 a-c. The average Rprogrammed values after each applied pulse were plotted with the symbol
★ in Figure 3-5a-c. The box chart in Figure 3-5a-c represents the 25 th to 75th percentile of the 20
measured Rprogrammed values after each applied pulse.
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Figure 3-5: Statistical analysis on the programming variability observed in Figure 3-4d-f. (a-c) The
minimum and maximum programmed resistance values measured after each applied pulse are
plotted with ✳, the average is plotted as ★, the box chart represents the 25th to 75th percentile of
the 20 data points, and the raw data points are plotted as the small scattered ◇. (d-f) Coefficient of
variation (CV) as a function of applied pulse amplitudes. The areas with higher CV (> 1) are
highlighted with green boxes. (g-i) Distribution of different states in a 2-bit per cell scheme, i.e.
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4-level programming scheme for the 20 cells of each dimension. The arrows in (h) and (i) indicate
equal distribution of the 4 programmed states 00, 01, 10, and 11, an essential PUF feature.
Then, the coefficient of variation (CV) for the 20 Rprogrammed values after each applied pulse
were calculated (Figure 3-5d-f). CV is also known as the relative standard deviation and is the
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. A CV value over 1 represents high variability, whereas
below 1 indicates low variability. For the wide rectangular cells, CV > 1 was only obtained for the
Rprogrammed values after applying 3.1 and 3.2 V amplitude pulses (Figure 3-5d). On the other hand,
CV > 1 was found for the Rprogrammed values measured after the 17 consecutive pulses from 1.95 to
2.35 V amplitudes for 260 nm rectangular narrow cells (Figure 3-5e). For the 100 nm narrow dogbone cells, CV > 1 was found after applying almost all pulse amplitudes (Figure 3-5f).
These high variability regions of CV > 1 are highlighted with green boxes in Figure 3-5af and it is evident that the Rprogrammed variability increases as the cell width decreases. The broad
spread of Rprogrammed values in the narrow rectangular and narrow dog-bone cells show promising
opportunity for multi-bit PUFs. The cell-to-cell randomness in Rprogrammed attained after a certain
number of applied pulses due to the varying pace of gradual programming with this pulsing scheme
can produce distinctly different responses to the same challenge on different cells, which can be
utilized to implement a multi-level PUF. Threshold resistances (Rth) were defined for
distinguishing the quantized levels in a 2-bit, i.e. 4-level PUF design. Rth values for the three cell
types between the distinct quantized states 00, 01, 10, and 11 are listed in Table 3-1. These Rth
values are chosen individually for the three different cell dimensions to ensure the best achievable
equal distribution of different states. These state distribution maps are plotted in Figure 3-5g-i.
The less variable programming trend in the wide rectangular cells is evident from the state
distribution map in Figure 3-5g, which indicates comparatively similar progression of partial reset
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operations in the 20 cells. On the other hand, the large programming variability is clear from the
state distribution maps shown in Figure 3-5h,i, where the occurrence of various states is observed
after a certain amplitude of applied pulses. The arrows shown in Figure 3-5h,i indicate the pulse
amplitudes for which equal distribution of the 4 states are obtained.
Table 3-1: Threshold resistance values (Rthreshold) used to distinguish states 00, 01, 10, and 11.
Cell type

W (nm)

Rthreshold(00-01) (Ω)

Rthreshold(01-10) (Ω)

Rthreshold(10-11) (Ω)

Wide rectangular

700

4000

800,000

20,000,000

Narrow rectangular

260

3850

8000

100,000

Narrow dog-bone

100

2400

7,000

130,000

It is important to note that the state distributions can be tuned by changing the Rth values
for each cell dimension. Moreover, Rth values need to be calibrated for each cell dimension.
Another important point is that the spontaneous resistance drift evolving from different states in a
multi-bit PUF can often mix different states, which is a major concern for MLC operation, too.
Established solutions, such as cell-state metric can be adopted, in which different read voltages are
used for reading different cell resistances and thus the measured resistance evolution over time
becomes unaffected without any concern for mixing of states [106].

3.6

Conclusion

The variations in programming trends was studied for different dimensions of Ge 2Sb2Te5 phase
change memory line cells by applying repeated pulses of identical and gradually increasing
amplitudes. When the repeated pulses with identical amplitudes were applied, the wide cells
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produced similar resistance trends with moderate degree of variability, whereas the narrow cells
showed unpredictable resistance trends, showing opportunity for the PUF applications.
Considering the large number of applied pulses and the lengthy programming time, the repeated
pulses with gradually increasing amplitudes were preferred for a more practical PUF application.
For the second pulsing scheme, a gradual reset is achieved on different cells with slightly varying
programming pace in the wide cells and with a much stronger variability in the narrow cells. This
varying programming pace in narrow cells with the gradually increasing amplitude pulsing
approach provides possibility of multi-bit PUF implementation with distinct resistance levels.
The overall enhanced variability observed in both programming schemes with any cell
dimension can be ascribed to the additional capacitive currents originating from the parasitic
components present in the experimental setup, such as the load resistance and the capacitances
involved in the connectors and the thermal runaway present in the fcc and amorphous phases of
GST. These parasitic components can be integrated in the PUF chip. The larger variations observed
in the pace of gradual reset process in the narrow rectangular and dog-bone cells as compared to
the wide rectangular ones can be attributed to the larger:
1. process variations (cell geometry, i.e. length, width, and thickness),
2. initial crystalline resistance variations [37], [38] due to grain distribution variations [89],
3. intrinsic reset variability due to the random locations and sizes of the amorphized volumes
in line cells [81], [107] and also due to the random atomic configuration in the amorphized
volumes [58], and
4. variable resistance drift appearing at the randomly evolved intermediate states in between
consecutive pulses [63], [64], [101].
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Chapter 4 | Amorphized Length and Variability in
PCM
4.1

Abstract

The dimensions of amorphized regions in phase-change memories are critical parameters to design
devices for different applications but are difficult to determine by direct imaging. In this chapter,
the length of amorphized regions in multiple, identical Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST) line cells was extracted
from electrical measurements. After each cell was programmed to an amorphous state, a sequence
of increasing amplitude post-reset voltage pulses separated by low-amplitude read DC-sweeps was
applied. When a sufficient amplitude post-reset voltage pulse was applied to a given cell, the
measured current and the post-pulse resistance increased drastically, indicating the cell reamorphized after threshold switching, melting, and quenching. The amorphized length was
calculated using the measured voltage at which threshold switching took place and the expected
drifted threshold field at that time. The measured threshold voltages, hence, the extracted
amorphized lengths, generally increase linearly with the programmed resistance levels, but
significant variability arises from the intrinsic uniqueness in the crystallization and amorphization
processes in these devices. For example, cells programmed to ~50 MΩ amorphous resistance show
threshold voltages of ~5-7 V, corresponding to amorphized lengths of ~240-360 nm. This
unpredictable programming feature in phase-change memory devices can be utilized in hardware
security applications.
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4.2

Introduction

Phase change memory (PCM) is an emerging non-volatile memory technology with high
endurance, high speed, and good scalability. PCM relies on the change in phase of a nano-scale
volume of a chalcogenide material sandwiched between two electrodes. The phase of the material
can be switched between the high resistivity (amorphous or reset) and the low resistivity
(crystalline or set) states by appropriate electrical pulses. The amorphization or reset process in
PCM is achieved with a short and abrupt electrical pulse which melt-quenches the active region
[47]. Nanoscale PCM devices exhibit significant cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle programming
variability due to the intrinsic randomness in the crystallization and amorphization processes, in
addition to any fabrication process variations. This probabilistic programming feature in PCM is
recently being considered for several applications in hardware security, such as physical
unclonable functions or true random number generators [32], [56], [57], [88], [100]. It is critical
to characterize the physical factors contributing to the observed variability for conclusive
understanding and proper utilization of this feature for these hardware security primitives. An
essential physical parameter contributing to the programming variability is the random location
and dimensions of different phases formed in the cell. The amorphous and crystalline regions in
PCM devices can be distinguished by transmission electron microscopy (TEM) imaging [108], but
this is a difficult and time-consuming process, and the sample preparation and imaging processes
themselves may disturb the state of the material [109], [110]. Hence, TEM becomes impractical
for variability analysis using a large number of devices.
In this study, the lengths of the amorphized regions during reset are calculated using
electrical measurements on twenty-five Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST-225) PCM line cells of very similar
dimensions. The crystalline PCM line cells were first amorphized with a reset pulse. Then a
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sequence of post-reset pulses was applied, with gradually increasing amplitudes. The cells were
read after each pulse. When the applied post-reset pulse amplitude was high enough, a significant
increase in the measured current and post-pulse cell resistance was observed, indicating reamorphization after threshold switching, melting, and subsequent quenching, as inferred from the
measurements and SPICE circuit simulation results. The measured threshold voltage, and the
drifted threshold field at that time are used to extract the amorphized length (Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1: Schematic procedure used in this chapter for extraction of amorphized length in phasechange line cells.

4.3

Threshold Switching in PCM

Threshold switching is defined by a sudden and reversible physical process in amorphous
chalcogenides that accompanies a sharp decrease in resistance. Various models were presented in
the 1970s to explain the threshold switching process; some of these models indicated pure thermal
effects [111], some referred to pure electrical effects [112], and others pointed to a combination of
both [113]. The argument was settled for decades with the dominance of the electrical model but
then re-ignited in the last decade by the difficulties in understanding threshold switching in
nanoscale PCM cells. Among the several new explanations based on electrical [114]–[118] and
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thermally assisted [119] effects, the electrical models are again prevailing, even though the specific
mechanisms are expected to depend on the device geometry and dimensions [119]. According to
the current understanding, threshold switching is initiated by electrical breakdown due to impact
ionization, a purely electrical effect. The following sharp increase in current is ascribed to thermal
runaway, i.e. the decrease in resistivity with increasing temperature that leads to further heating
[117]. In this chapter, this model is used to interpret the measurement results.
Krebs et al. measured the threshold field of 56 V/µm for as-deposited GST amorphous
bridge cells by measuring the threshold voltages of various known dimensions and concluded that
threshold field is a material-dependent physical parameter, whereas, the specific threshold voltage
depends on the device geometry [117]. As-deposited amorphous cells of known dimensions were
used in Krebs’ measurements, instead of the melt-quenched ones, to avoid the difficulty in
determining the dimensions of the amorphized regions, but the drift time since deposition, which
is a critical parameter, is difficult to extract. Since threshold voltage, Vthreshold (t) drifts upward in
time [120], an effective threshold field, Ethreshold (t) is also expected to drift similarly, while the
amorphized length, Lamorphized is expected to remain the same over time, despite structural
relaxation [121] or other physical processes that may occur in the amorphous volume below the
glass transition:

𝐸

(𝑡) =

𝑉
𝐿

(𝑡)

(4-1)

Lankhorst et al. measured a threshold field of 30-40 V/µm from melt-quenched GST
devices at ~100 ns after amorphization [122]. Based on the known elapsed time after
amorphization, t0 and the threshold field at t0, Ethreshold (t0), it is possible to extract the threshold
field Ethreshold (t) at the elapsed time between amorphization and the time when Vthreshold (t) was
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measured, t using the logarithmic trend of threshold voltage drift and the room temperature
threshold voltage drift co-efficient, γ of 0.02 reported by Karpov et al. [120]:
𝑉
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(4-3)

In this chapter, Ethreshold (t0) of 35±5 V/µm, calculated by Lankhorst et al. at t0 ~ 100 ns
after amorphization for melt-quenched amorphous line cells, is used to obtain Ethreshold (t) at
different measured times t, on different cells programmed to similar amorphous resistance using
equation (4-3) and γ of 0.02, to then calculate Lamorphized and discuss the associated variability [107].
It is important to note that the term ‘electrical breakdown’ here refers to the reversible threshold
switching process observed in these materials and not to the permanent and detrimental electrical
breakdown failure that occurs in any dielectric.

4.4

Methods

The GST-225 line cells used for this study were on silicon dioxide (SiO2), had bottom metal
contact pads (tungsten with Ti/TiN liner), and were capped by silicon nitride [67]. All cells were
~130 nm in width, WGST, ~470 nm in length between the metal contacts, LGST, and ~50 nm in
thickness, tGST (example scanning electron microscopy or SEM image in inset, Figure 4-2a). The
as-fabricated cells were annealed in a Janis ST-500-UHT probe station at a pressure of ~1 mTorr
at 675 K for 10 minutes to reach the stable hexagonal close packed or hcp crystalline phase
(annealing profile shown in Figure 4-2a). The electrical measurements were performed after
cooling to room temperature. Electrical pulses, generated by an arbitrary function generator
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(Tektronix AFG 3102), were applied to the cells; a series load resistor of 5.1 kΩ was used to limit
the current. The experimental circuit schematic is shown in Figure 4-2b. The experimental circuit
was terminated through a digital oscilloscope (Tektronix DPO 4104) using two termination
resistors of 50 Ω connected to channel 3 and 4. The applied voltage was monitored with Channel
1 of the oscilloscope and the voltage across the parallel combination of two 50 Ω resistors was
monitored with channel 3 and 4 to determine the current through the cell. A semiconductor
parameter analyzer (Agilent 4156C) was used for low-voltage read operations with a DC voltage
sweep between −0.1 to +0.1 V for all resistance levels. A relay circuit, controlled by an Arduino
Mega 2560 card, was used to switch between the reading and programming sequences of the
measurements.

Figure 4-2: (a) Temperature ramp used for annealing as-fabricated amorphous devices to hcp
phase, with a constant 675 K for the last 10 minutes. Inset shows the SEM image of an untested
annealed GST line cell, with metal-to-metal LGST ~470 nm, WGST ~130 nm, and tGST ~50 nm. (b)
Electrical measurement setup.
Twenty-five identical hcp line cells with similar initial crystalline resistance values
(Rcrystalline) were amorphized to similar programmed resistance level (Rprogrammed) of ~107 Ω with a
comparatively narrow distribution, so that the variations in initial Rprogrammed do not greatly affect

105

the extraction of Lamorphized. Table 4-1 shows the statistical distributions of the Rcrystalline and
Rprogrammed values for the 25 measured GST cells. Due to intrinsic variability and process variations
observed from cell to cell, the number(s) and the amplitude(s) of the applied voltage pulses to
reach Rprogrammed of ~107 Ω varied slightly [57], [100]. The applied voltage amplitude required for
this “initial reset” varied between ~2 and ~2.5 V whereas the number of pulses varied between 1
and 10. All amorphization voltage pulses were rectangular with a duration tduration of ~200 ns and
rise and fall times trise = tfall of ~25 ns. Once the cells reached this initial reset condition, a sequence
of rectangular “post-reset pulses”, with gradually increasing amplitudes (0.4 V to 10 V with a 0.1
V increment), and same tduration, trise, and tfall as used in the initial reset step, were applied. Lowvoltage DC sweep read operations were performed before and after each applied pulse. Figure 4-3
shows the schematic of the measurement sequences.
Table 4-1: Statistical Distribution of Cell Resistance: Minimum, maximum, and median of the
crystalline and programmed resistance values (Rcrystalline and Rprogrammed) of the 25 measured GST
cells (LGST ~470 nm, WGST ~130 nm, and tGST ~50 nm).
Cell resistance

Minimum resistance

Maximum resistance

Median

Rcrystalline

267 Ω

3162 Ω

522 Ω

Rprogrammed

8 MΩ

65 MΩ

28 MΩ
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Figure 4-3: Measurement sequence. One or more pulses were applied to initially reset the hcp cells.
Then a sequence of pulses with increasing amplitude (from 0.4 to 10 V in 0.1 V increment) were
applied until further re-amorphization and eventually physical breaking occurred with loss of
electrical connection. Low voltage read operations were performed before and after each applied
pulse.

4.5

Results

The amorphized devices showed the expected steady upward resistance drift right after being
initially reset [64], [65]. The monotonous drift continued until a sufficient Vpost-reset was applied,
when a significantly higher amplitude current was measured during the pulse and a drastic increase
in Rprogrammed was observed after the pulse. These results indicate that threshold switching took
place and thermal runaway of the amorphous state was initiated by the parasitic capacitive spike
that followed. A SPICE simulation was performed to extract the cell voltage and current (Vcell and
Icell) by inputting the measured voltage waveforms at channel 1 (Vch1) and channel 3,4 (Vch3,4) as
voltage sources. The extracted high amplitude and sharp rising edge of Icell would cause melting
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of the material [123]; and the abrupt decrease of Icell due to the discharge of parasitic capacitance,
would quench the cells quickly [124] resulting in re-amorphization (see section 4.6 in page 114).
An example of the re-amorphization procedure on an initially amorphized cell is shown in
Figure 4-4a with Rprogrammed plotted as a function of Vpost-reset. This cell was initially amorphized at
7.5 MΩ, with a certain amorphized length Lamorphized(1). A schematic of the possible phase
distribution in the cell after the initial reset is shown in Figure 4-5a. The amorphous cell started to
show the usual upward resistance drift, which was unaffected by the early lower Vpost-reset pulses.
After a Vpost-reset of 1.9 V was applied, Rprogrammed drastically increased from the drifted amorphous
resistance value of 10.55 MΩ to 48.05 MΩ (Figure 4-4a). The measured current through the
channel 3 and 4 termination resistors showed a sudden overshoot (with a peak of ~0.46 mA, green
solid line, Figure 4-4b). This current amplitude was significantly higher than the barely noticeable
current that flew through these termination resistors for all the lower Vpost-reset amplitudes. An
example recorded current waveform through the channel 3 and 4 termination resistors for Vpost-reset
of 1 V is plotted in Figure 4-4b (blue dotted line) to show the difference. Even though all
waveforms were monitored, only a few were recorded to avoid adding extra elapsed time between
amorphization and threshold switching. The 1.9 V amplitude pulse caused a threshold switching,
by means of the electrical breakdown of the already-existing insulating amorphous region of length
Lamorphized(1). Therefore, 1.9 V is the threshold voltage Vthreshold(1) for the breakdown of length
Lamorphized(1). The increased amorphous resistance indicates a larger effective length of the new
amorphous region Lamorphized(2) (Figure 4-5b), even though any voids formed would also alter the
overall cell resistance. The cell again started to drift upward and stayed unaffected by the next few
post-reset pulses until the next threshold switching event at Vthreshold(2) of 8.2 V, of the amorphized
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region of length Lamorphized(2). At this point, the wire itself broke physically, and electrical
connection was lost, possibly due to void formation in the middle of the cell (Figure 4-5c).

Figure 4-4: Repeated post-reset pulses of 200 ns duration and 0.4 to 10 V amplitudes (with an
increment of 0.1 V) applied to an amorphous cell with LGST of ~470 nm, WGST of ~130 nm, and
tGST of ~50 nm, and initially programmed to ~7.5 MΩ. (a) Evolution of Rprogrammed as a function of
post-reset pulse amplitude (Vpost-reset). (b) Example waveforms of applied voltage and current
through termination resistors during an unsuccessful (blue dotted line) re-amorphization, a
successful (green solid line) re-amorphization, and a breaking episode when electrical connections
are lost (red solid line). The voltage and current waveforms for the Vpost-reset of 1.9 and 8.2 V are
inputted in the SPICE simulations and the resulting cell voltage and current Vcell and Icell are
extracted by modeling the experimental setup circuitry (section 4.6 in page 114).
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Figure 4-5: Schematic illustration of the calculation of amorphized length for the two post-reset
re-amorphization episodes shown in Figure 4-4: (a) after initial reset, (b) after first reamorphization at Vthreshold(1) of 1.9 V, (c) after second re-amorphization and physical breaking with
loss of electrical connection at Vthreshold(2) of 8.2 V. Threshold voltages indicate the voltage at which
the already existing amorphous region experienced electrical breakdown during threshold
switching.
We repeated this re-amorphization study on 25 cells and measured Vthreshold (t) values,
which was plotted against the programmed resistance values measured at 10 s after amorphization
(Rprogrammed (10 s)) in Figure 4-6a. Cells with higher Rprogrammed (17 out of 25 cells) physically broke
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after the first amorphization (i.e. initial reset) without any intermediate re-amorphization episode
and are plotted as spheres in Figure 4-6a. The loss of electrical connection in the wire was
confirmed by post-pulse DC I-V characteristics and SEM imaging performed after the electrical
characterization (Figure 4-6b). Cells that experienced one or more re-amorphization episode(s) are
plotted as stars connected with dotted lines in Figure 4-6a. The extrapolated Ethreshold (t) (Figure
4-7a) and measured Vthreshold (t) (Figure 4-7b), both at a certain time t, which is different for
different measured cells, are used to calculate Lamorphized (Figure 4-7c) using equation (4-1). Since
Lamorphized remains the same for a given amorphized region, it is only important to consistently
extrapolate Ethreshold (t) at the time t when Vthreshold (t) is measured.

Figure 4-6: Vthreshold (left Y) and estimated Lamorphized (right Y) for 25 identical cells as a function
of Rprogrammed. The data-points for different cells are plotted with different colors. Cells that
demonstrated multiple re-amorphization events are plotted with stars connected with dotted lines
(8 out of 25 cells) and the ones experiencing single re-amorphization event are plotted with spheres
(17 out of 25 cells).
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Figure 4-7: Logarithmic upward drift of threshold field Ethreshold (t) [120] and the associated error
from the reported value [122] as a function of elapsed time after amorphization t. (b) Measured
threshold voltage Vthreshold (t) as a function of the measured Rprogrammed, (c) calculated Lamorphized with
the error propagated from the reported Ethreshold (t0) as a function of the measured Rprogrammed, and
(d) calculated ρamorphous (10 s) with the error propagated from the reported Ethreshold (t0) as a function
of the measured Rprogrammed.
We observed a linear relation between the measured Vthreshold (t) and Rprogrammed (Figure 4-6
and Figure 4-7b), which in turn is linearly related with the calculated Lamorphized with a moderate
degree of variability (Figure 4-7c). The error in the reported Ethreshold (t0) of ±5 V/µm is propagated
in the extrapolated Ethreshold (t) and the calculated Lamorphized, plotted as the gray error bars in Figure
4-7, using the standard methods of propagation of uncertainties [125]. In addition to this
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variability, there was also cell-to-cell variability in the measured Vthreshold (t) value for a certain
Rprogrammed (Figure 4-6a) and this cell-to-cell variability is also propagated to the zero-intercept
fitted expression for Lamorphized:

𝑉

𝐿

𝑉
10 𝑀𝛺

=𝑅

× (1.29 ± 0.04)

=𝑅

× (60.82 ± 2.11)

𝑛𝑚
10 𝑀𝛺

(4-4)

(4-5)

Equations (4-4) and (4-5) show that for an amorphous region programmed to 10 MΩ, a
Vthreshold of 1.29 ± 0.04 V is required for threshold switching, indicating an Lamorphized of 61.32 ±
2.13 nm. Besides process variations, these variations observed in Vthreshold (t) and Lamorphized can be
ascribed to:
 variations in the initial Rcrystalline values (shown in Table 4-1 for the 25 measured cells), due
to the random arrangement of grains in the cells [37], [38], [89],
 variations in shape of the amorphous volumes within the dog-bone shaped line cell,
 slightly different numbers and amplitudes of the applied initial reset pulse(s), which might
have amorphized the cell either with a single pulse or with multiple pulses in a more gradual
manner [100],
 variations in reported Ethreshold (t0) itself (35 ± 5 V/µm [122]),
 random arrangement of any voids created after every reset operation (Figure 4-6b) [90],
and
 variable amorphous resistance drift [58] of different cells during the elapsed times between
amorphization and threshold switching.
113

Assuming an ideal uniform cross-section of the amorphous regions, covering the entire
cross-section area 𝐴

=𝑊

×𝑡

(WGST ~130 nm, tGST ~50 nm), the amorphous

resistivity at ~10 s after amorphization, ρamorphous (10 s), can be calculated using the extracted
Lamorphized and the drifted Rprogrammed (10 s):

𝜌

𝑊×𝑡

(10 𝑠) =

=

𝐿
𝑅

130 × 10 𝑚 × 50 × 10 𝑚
(6.13 ± 0.21) × 10
𝑚/Ω

(10 𝑠)

(4-6)

= 106.04 ± 3.58 Ω. 𝑐𝑚
The calculated ρamorphous (10 s) is plotted as a function of the Rprogrammed at 10 s Figure 4-7d.
The calculated ρamorphous (10 s) is ~ 106 Ω.cm, consistent with earlier reported value of ~148 Ω.cm
at ~60 s after amorphization obtained from line cells [67]. It is important to note that the ρamorphous
(10 s) calculation uses the extracted Lamorphized vs. measured Rprogrammed at 10 s values, measured
under low-field (-0.1 to +0.1 V DC sweep) after the post-reset pulse was applied, hence ρamorphous
is a low-field resistivity calculation.

4.6

SPICE Simulations

Our experimental setup includes parasitic capacitances which significantly contribute to the
observed transients and phase change dynamics. This section discusses these contributions using
SPICE simulations of the approximate circuit model.
Figure 4-8a illustrates the approximate circuit model of the experimental setup shown in
Figure 4-2b with the following components:
1. Channel 1 termination resistance, Rch1 = 50 Ω.
2. Capacitance of coaxial cable to channel 1 termination, Cch1 = 110 pF.
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3. Cell resistance, Rcell: values used for SPICE simulations are listed in Table 4-2.
4. Capacitance of probe arm to load resistor, Cload = 20 pF.
5. Load resistance, Rload = 5.1 kΩ.
6. Channel 3 and 4 termination resistance in parallel, Rch3,4 = 50 || 50 Ω = 25 Ω.
7. Capacitance of coaxial cable to combined channel 3 and 4 terminations, Cch3,4 = 110 pF.

Figure 4-8: (a) Approximate circuit model of experimental setup with measured parasitic
capacitance and resistance values. (b) Simplified circuit model simulated in SPICE with the
measured Vch1 and Vch3,4 waveforms. (c) Modeling of GST resistance switching with three switches
in SPICE.
To simulate the experimental non-ideal conditions, the measured voltage waveforms are
inputted for channel 1 (Vch1) and channel 3 and 4 (Vch3,4) of Figure 4-4b as voltage sources in the
SPICE model. Figure 4-8b shows the simplified circuit model, in which the parasitic capacitances
and termination resistances for both channel 1 and channel 3,4 are already taken into account with
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the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4. Rcell is switched between the measured amorphous resistance before
pulse Ramorphous(before-pulse), a molten resistance Rmolten of 140 Ω, and the measured amorphous
resistance after pulse Ramorphous(after-pulse) (Figure 4-8c) for the two re-amorphization events shown
in Figure 4-4b. The Rmolten value is assumed to be 140 Ω for all simulations, which is slightly less
than the hcp Rcrystalline, since melting incorporates a drop in the GST resistivity (as shown in Figure
4-9 inset) [94]. Table 4-2 lists these different resistance values used for the circuit simulations.
Table 4-2: Cell resistance Rcell used in simulations.
Rcell

Ramorphous(before-pulse) (MΩ)

Rmolten (Ω)

Ramorphous(after-pulse) (MΩ)

10.55

140

48.05

82.66

140

392656.81

1st Re-amorphization
(at 1.9 V)
2nd Re-amorphization
(at 8.2 V)
Melting and re-amorphization of GST cell is simulated with three switches S1, S2, and S3
that sequentially turn on and off to include the appropriate Rcell (Figure 4-8c). For both reamorphization cases, the melting is assumed to take place when Vch3,4 starts to rise and the reamorphization is assumed to take place right after the peak of Vch3,4. Table 4-3 lists the melting
and re-amorphization instances for the two re-amorphization events used in simulations. At the
starting of the simulation, S1 is closed while S2 and S3 are kept open to use Ramorphous(before-pulse) as
the starting Rcell. During melting, Rcell is switched from Ramorphous(before-pulse) to Rmolten by opening S1
and closing S2, with S3 open. For re-amorphization, Rcell is switched from Rmolten to Ramorphous(afterpulse)

by opening S2 and closing S3, with S1 open.
116

Figure 4-9: GST resistivity change as a function of temperature, measured data on 100 nm GST
thin film (re-plotted from reference [94]). Inset shows an expanded view of the resistivity drop
during melting.
Table 4-3: Melting and re-amorphization instances for the two re-amorphization events used in
simulations.
Melting instance (ns)

Re-amorphization instance (ns)

1st Re-amorphization (at 1.9 V)

214

228

2nd Re-amorphization (at 8.2 V)

224

226

The measured waveforms shown in Figure 4-4b only show Vch1 and the current through the
channel 3,4 termination,

Ω

. To understand the phase change dynamics in the GST cell due to

transient behaviors, it is necessary to compute the resulting cell voltage and current, Vcell and Icell,
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respectively. Therefore, the voltage at the two ends of the cell Vch1 and Vinternal, Vch3,4, Vcell, and Icell
are monitored in the simulations.
To compare the magnitudes of the voltage and current values for the 1 st and 2nd reamorphization events, the ratio

is calculated for each. Table 4-4 lists the peak

amplitudes for Vch1, Vch3,4, Vcell, and Icell and the ratios of these voltage and current values during
the two re-amorphization events. This ratio is 4.59 for Vch1 but 0.32 for Vch3,4 (Table 4-4 and Figure
4-10b). Similar ratios of 5.77 and 5.64 were obtained for Vcell and Icell, respectively (Figure
4-10c,d), which is similar to the ratio calculated for Vch1.
Table 4-4: Peak amplitudes for Vch1, Vch3,4, Vcell, and Icell and the ratios of these voltage and current
values during the two re-amorphization events.
Vch1 peak

Vch3,4 peak

Vcell peak

(V)

(mV)

(V)

1st re-amorphization

1.98

11.20

1.51

10.77

2nd re-amorphization

9.08

3.55

8.72

60.76

4.59

0.32

5.77

5.64

Icell peak (mA)

2
1

𝑟𝑒 − 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑟𝑒 − 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

For both re-amorphization events, the Vcell ≈ Vch1 at the beginning, when Rcell ≈
Ramorphous(before-pulse), since Ramorphous(before-pulse) >> Rload and most of the applied Vch1 voltage is
dropped across the cell. When melting occurs, the Vcell decreases and Icell increases sharply, since
Rmolten << Rload. When quenching occurs, Vcell increases slowly again, since Ramorphous(after-pulse) >>
Rload and Icell decreases sharply (Figure 4-10c,d) due to amorphization.
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Figure 4-11 shows the details of the pulse transition edges of Figure 4-10 (highlighted in
green and pink boxes in Figure 4-10). Icell for each of the re-amorphization events consists of a
very sharp triangular current pulse (of ~15 ns duration and ~7.5 mA amplitude for the 1 st reamorphization and ~3 ns duration and ~60 mA amplitude for the 2 nd event), which occurs during
the rising edge of the Vch1 (Figure 4-11). The very sharp rising edges of Icell for the two reamorphization events can be attributed to the additional capacitive current contributions due to the
parasitic capacitances present in the system and to the thermal runaway of amorphous GST, which
also lead to a quick rise of the cell temperature and produce enough Joule heating to induce
melting. The sharp falling edges of Icell for the two re-amorphization events can initiate quenching
and block the conduction path after amorphization. As a result, Vch3,4 consistently showed a slow
decay due to the discharge of the parasitic capacitances of the setup.
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Figure 4-10: Simulated cell voltage and current during 1 st (solid blue line) and 2nd (dotted black
line) re-amorphization events.
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Figure 4-11: Expanded view of the rise and fall transitions of the applied voltage V ch1 (the
highlighted regions of Figure 4-10). Simulated cell voltage and current during 1 st (solid blue line)
and 2nd (dotted black line) re-amorphization events.
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4.7

Conclusion

We propose a method to extract amorphized length in phase-change memory devices based on
electrical measurements and use it to study the variability in amorphized lengths in 25 amorphized
GST line cells of identical dimensions. Each cell is initially programmed to a similar amorphous
resistance level (~ 8-65 MΩ) and then tested with a sequence of post-reset pulses of gradually
increasing amplitude, separated by low-amplitude read DC sweeps. When the post-reset pulse
amplitude is sufficient, a given cell undergoes threshold switching, melting and quenching and is
re-amorphized. The process is continued until the cell breaks to observe as many re-amorphization
events as possible. Each re-amorphization event is observed as a sudden increase in current during
the pulse and a higher resistance after pulse, corresponding to a larger effective amorphized
volume. The sharp increase in cell current is due to the parasitic capacitive current and thermal
runaway in amorphous GST. The re-amorphization to increasingly higher resistance levels is also
due to the sharp capacitive discharge current at the end of the post-reset pulse. Using the measured
threshold voltage, and assuming an effective drifted threshold field at that switching time, the
length of the amorphized region that experienced threshold switching was extracted, for each reamorphization event, and it was related with its previous resistance level.
This technique allows extraction of amorphized length from electrical characterization
alone, which is important for device operation and failure analysis. A generally linear relation is
observed, but with a significant spread, between the amorphized length and the programmed
resistance. The amorphous resistivity calculated using the extracted amorphized length and the
drifted programmed resistance, assuming the cross-section of the amorphous regions is uniform
and equal to the cell cross-section, is ~106 Ω.cm, within the range of previously reported values
for melt-quenched GST.
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The variability in the calculated amorphized lengths, based on the measured threshold
voltages, can be attributed to different physical mechanisms such as the variable amorphous
resistance drift and cycling history, the unique amorphous volumes formed, and different
crystalline and amorphous initial conditions. SEM images of physically broken cells captured after
the electrical measurements show the randomness in distribution of voids formed during recurrent
reset operations, one of the expected factors in the observed variability. Combining these different
physical sources of intrinsic variability in cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle operations, PCM devices
offer a promising platform for hardware security primitives.
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Chapter 5 | Resistance

Drift

in

PCM

and

its

Applications in Hardware Security
5.1

Abstract

Resistance drift and crystallization are critical concerns for accurate distinction between different
states and for data retention in phase change memory (PCM), but their underlying physical
mechanisms are still not fully understood. In this chapter, the resistance drift and crystallization of
suspended and on-oxide amorphous Ge2Sb2Te5 PCM line cells are compared. 15 cells of each type
are programmed at room temperature to a resistance level of ~10 MΩ and their resistances are
monitored over ~3 months. The initial upward resistance drift trends are very similar for both cell
types, but the later behaviour is noticeably different. The suspended cells exhibit increased
variability in the upward drift after ~103 s, and at ~35-80 days some cells experience an abrupt
crystallization, some show a saturation in the upward resistance drift, and others continue the
upward resistance drift with fluctuations, possibly due to the imminent saturation. The on-oxide
cells, on the other hand, demonstrate very consistent upward resistance drift during the entire
measurement period. Temperature-accelerated measurements at 400 K on both type of cells also
show the early and abrupt data loss in suspended cells. The abrupt crystallization in suspended
PCM cells can potentially be useful for self-destructive hardware security primitives based on the
loss of the stored data after a certain time.
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5.2

Introduction

Phase change memory (PCM) is an emerging non-volatile memory technology with high speed,
high endurance, and good cell scalability. PCM relies on the reversible phase change of a
chalcogenide material, typically Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST), between the high and low electrical resistance
states (amorphous and crystalline phases) [47]. The amorphous phase in GST experiences a
significant spontaneous upward resistance drift following a power law [58] before the subsequent
decrease of resistance as the material transitions into crystalline face cantered cubic (fcc) and then
into the stable hexagonal close packed (hcp) phase [65]. Resistance drift and crystallization pose
device reliability concerns in distinction among states in multi-level cell operation and in data
retention. The anomalous upward amorphous resistance drift in PCM has been linked with the
structural relaxation of defects formed during the melt-quenching process in amorphization [121],
while the expected crystallization is due to the nucleation and growth of seed crystallites in the
amorphous volume. These spontaneous processes have been reported to depend on temperature
[65], [72], read current [76], and the programmed resistance levels [58]. A study of resistance drift
in unstressed and externally stressed GST films and in PCM cells with compressive or tensile stress
induced by adjacent stressor layers showed that mechanical stress does not play an important role
in the upward resistance drift of GST [126].
In this chapter, observations of long-term resistance evolutions in suspended and on-oxide
(on-SiO2) GST line cells are reported, where the mechanical stress experienced by the two cell
types is expected to be significantly different (Figure 5-1a-d). The measured cells are of very
similar dimensions and the measurements are performed at room temperature and at 400 K. The
electrical characterization results show shorter data retention time for the suspended cells as
compared to that for the on-oxide cells. Even though this early data loss trend is detrimental for
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long-term memory applications, it can be promising for hardware security applications. PCM cells
have been studied before as candidate devices for hardware security as physical unclonable
functions [32] or true random number generator [81] exploiting the inherent stochastic
programming capability [88]. Here, a possible application of suspended PCM cells is presented
for time-sensitive hardware security devices utilizing the spontaneous resistance drift and early
crystallization.

Figure 5-1: Suspended and on-oxide cells: (a,b) schematics of cell layout [67], (c,d) scanning
electron microscopy (SEM) images. (e) Electrical measurement setup.

5.3

Methods

The measured suspended and on-oxide GST line cells were of 320-340 nm in length, 260-280 nm
in width, and 50 nm in thickness. The cells were capped by Si 3N4 and had bottom metal contact
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pads (CVD grown TiN + PVD grown TiN for the suspended cells and CVD grown W contacts
with Ti/TiN liner for the on-oxide cells) (Figure 5-1a-d). For the suspended cells, the underlying
silicon dioxide was etched by diluted Hydrofluoric Acid (10:1), and then the cell was coated with
Si3N4. The as-fabricated cells were annealed to 675 K for 10 minutes to stable hcp phase and then
were programmed to an amorphous resistance level (Rprogrammed) of ~107 Ω at room temperature
and ~106 Ω at 400 K. Because of the cell-to-cell process variations and the inherent programming
variability present in PCM cells, one or multiple pulses of 200 ns durations with variable
amplitudes (between 1.8 and 2.8 V) were applied on both types of cell to achieve a narrow
distribution of Rprogrammed to exclude the contribution of different Rprogrammed levels on the drift
properties. For both the room temperature and high temperature cases, the resistance of the
programmed cells was monitored from ~10 s after the end of the amorphization pulse. For the
room temperature measurement, the resistance was monitored at ~10 s intervals for ~5 minutes
and then at different intervals (4-5 times) up to ~3 months or ~8×10 6 s. For the 400 K measurement,
the resistance was monitored every ~10 s for a few days (~2-8 × 10 5 s) until complete
crystallization was attained.
The electrical measurement setup included an arbitrary function generating unit to generate
the programming pulses, an oscilloscope to measure the input and output voltages, and a parameter
analyzer to measure the cell resistance at any resistance level with a low-voltage DC sweep of 0.1 to +0.1 V (Figure 5-1e). A relay was used to automatically switch between the pulsing and
reading tasks. A load resistance of 5 kΩ was used to limit the current through the cell (Figure
5-1e).
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5.4

Results

The room temperature long-term resistance evolutions for suspended and on-oxide cells were
distinctly different. The suspended cells showed increased variability after ~10 3 s, and after ~3580 days a random behaviour was observed among the 15 cells with abrupt drop of resistance (for
3 cells), decreasing resistance (for 3 cells), saturating upward resistance drift (for 1 cell), and
fluctuating upward resistance drift (for the remaining 8 cells) (Figure 5-2a). The 15 on-oxide cells,
on the other hand, maintained steady upward resistance drift with minimal fluctuation and no
saturation or early crystallization at room temperature (Figure 5-2b). The larger fluctuation in the
upward resistance drift trend of the suspended cells is possibly due to the imminence of saturation
in the upward resistance drift trend.
The upward resistance drift is generally described with the following power law,

𝑅 = 𝑅 𝑙𝑛

𝑡
𝑡

(1)

where R and R0 are the resistances measured at times t and t0 respectively and ν is the drift
coefficient. Although the long-term resistance evolutions for two types of cell differ significantly,
the initial upward resistance drift for both the suspended and on-oxide cells followed
approximately the same trend with a drift coefficient of ~0.103±0.07 for the suspended cells and
~0.103±0.05 for the on-oxide cells (Figure 5-2a-c), similar to the previously reported value of
0.09-0.11 [58]. This confirms the previous findings of stress not playing a significant role on the
upward resistance drift of GST [126]. With time, the inconsistent resistance drift of the suspended
cells as compared to that of the on-oxide cells becomes more evident (Figure 5-2d). Whereas
majority of the on-oxide cells showed a steady upward resistance drift with a resulting resistance
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at ~3 months (R3months) ~4 times greater than the Rprogrammed [64], [101], many suspended cells
behaved unpredictably - some drifting upwards (blue dashed box in Figure 5-2d), some
crystallizing (maroon solid-lined ellipse in Figure 5-2d), and some undergoing abrupt resistance
drops (green dash-dotted box in Figure 5-2d). Due to the slightly different Rprogrammed values,
different suspended cells started crystallizing at slightly different elapsed times.

Figure 5-2: Measured resistance of (a) 15 suspended and (b) 15 on-oxide amorphous cells as a
function of time. Different colours represent different suspended and on-oxide cells. Insets of (a)
and (b) are the vertically zoomed-in versions that clearly show the trends after ~10 3 s. (c,d)
Resistance drift and crystallization in suspended (red star) and on-oxide (black sphere) cells as
function of Rprogrammed: (c) initial upward resistance drift coefficient; (d) ratio of the R3months to the
Rprogrammed. The green dash-dotted box shows the cells that already crystallized. The suspended
cells that already crystallized, the ones that are still undergoing upward resistance drift, and the
ones that are crystallizing are shown inside the green dash-dotted box, the blue dashed box, and
the maroon solid-lined ellipse in (d), respectively.
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The temperature-accelerated measurements at 400 K also showed the sudden drop in
resistance in the suspended cells, and a slower and more gradual crystallization in the on-oxide
cells (Figure 5-3), where the latter was not observed with the measurements performed at room
temperature. The suspended cells are expected to be mechanically relaxed compared to their onoxide counterparts and this may accelerate the spontaneous crystallization process leading to the
comparatively shorter upward drift followed by the faster and more abrupt decrease in resistance.

Figure 5-3: Resistance evolution in suspended (red stars) and on-oxide (black spheres) line cells
at 400 K.

5.5

Applications

Suspended PCM line cells can be used for time-sensitive hardware security devices to prevent
leakage of any sensitive data through physical attacks. These cells can be effectively used to store
secured data for a certain period after which the data will be self-destructed and inaccessible in an
irreversible way. However, as temperature accelerates the crystallization process, this method is
particularly sensitive to the ambient temperature. The inherent stochasticity involved in the data
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retention time of phase change materials could be further improved for security applications with
advances in materials engineering.
Another potential application of the resistance drift behaviour of PCM cells would be
counterfeit IC detection. Since the drift behaviour is spontaneous and independent of usage, PCM
cells could be used as passive time sensors to monitor how long an IC has been in the field and
thus, detect recycled or remarked ICs. Further, the accelerated drift and sudden drop in resistance
of the cells with increasing temperature could also be used for quickly detecting whether a chip
has been exposed to high temperatures, a scenario common during the IC recycling process.
Similarly, the freshness of perishable food products and medications, that are expected to remain
within precise temperature ranges in the supply chain, can be detected by monitoring the resistance
drift trend of an added PCM-based time sensor. Other potential uses of resistance drift behaviour
would be in hardware security primitives such as non-volatile monotonic counters, which are used
for preventing replay attacks, and drifting keys i.e., keys that gradually rotate to prevent cloning
attacks.

5.6

Conclusion

Resistance evolutions in suspended and on-oxide phase change memory line cells of similar
dimensions are examined at room temperature (15 cells of each type) and at 400 K (2 cells of each
type). The suspended and on-oxide cells programmed to similar resistance levels showed identical
initial upward resistance drift trend at room temperature, following the known power law with the
same reported drift coefficient (~0.1), but distinct patterns afterwards. The suspended cells show
a shorter upward drift period followed by increased variability and a much faster and drastic drop
in resistance into the crystalline states, possibly due to reduced or significantly different type of
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mechanical stress. Whereas the suspended cells are mechanically more relaxed and may sag in the
air in between the two contacts, the on-oxide cells are expected to experience greater mechanical
stress but also greater stability. The earlier and faster crystallization for suspended cells would
hinder memory applications due to undesired data loss but could be useful for hardware security
to store confidential and time-sensitive information for a limited, potentially pre-determined time.
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Chapter 6 | Tamper Evidence of SEM Imaging Attack
in PCM Cells
6.1

Abstract

Breach of security due to unauthorized access to electronic hardware devices or chips has recently
become a serious concern for the internet-connected daily activities. Imaging with electron
microscopy is one of the invasive techniques used to gain knowledge about a chip layout and
extract secret information by the attackers. Automatic destruction or disturbance of the secret key
during such invasive attacks are required to ensure protection against these attacks. In this chapter,
the disturbance caused to programmed phase change memory (PCM) cells by the imaging electron
beam during scanning electron microscopy (SEM) is experimentally characterized in terms of the
measured cell resistance. A sudden increase of resistance is observed on all imaged amorphous
cells while the cells programmed to intermediate states show either abrupt increase or erratic
decrease. These erratic disturbances of state are promising to mislead an attacker that is trying to
acquire a stored key and leave indelible marks of tampering. Since PCM is recently being
considered for implementation of various hardware security primitives, these beam-induced state
change and tamper-evidence features enhance security of PCM devices against physical attacks.

6.2

Introduction

Hardware security has recently become one of the important concerns for designing nano-scale
devices that are used for numerous activities based on extensive data exchange in the current age
of ‘internet of things’. Sensitive and private information exchanged during these communications
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can be leaked not only by cyber infringements but also by attacks on these hardware devices [6].
These attacks can be of two categories: invasive and non-invasive. Theft of service, critical
information, and intellectual property can take place when an adversary gains full control over the
hardware device and has access to advanced facilities to perform invasive or physical attacks, such
as micro-probing, reverse engineering, or imaging of the entire chip [127]. If the data stored in the
attacked device can be erased or modified during the invasive attack process itself, leakage of
sensitive information can be prevented.
Imaging a chip with scanning electron microscopy (SEM) is one of the physical forms of
hardware attacks [127]. However, imaging nano-scale devices with electron microscopy can often
be challenging. The amount of energy applied in such small volumes can disturb the material
properties, which becomes a serious concern for reliable operation in devices that are expected to
store a certain data for a long period. For phase change memory (PCM), one of the emerging nonvolatile memory (NVM) technologies based on resistive switching mechanism [128], which is
recently being considered for hardware security primitive implementations as well [100], these
changes in material properties often changes the states. References [109], [110], [129] show
evidences of beam-induced undesired crystallization during in-situ transmission electron
microscopy (TEM) imaging of an as-deposited amorphous thin film of Ge 2Sb2Te5 (GST), the most
widely used phase change material.
For SEM imaging, a focused electron beam hits the surface of a material. In the commonly
used secondary electron (SE) mode of SEM imaging, the atoms present within ~100 nm of the
surface go to higher energy states after being excited by the incident high-energy electron beam.
The secondary electrons emitted by these excited atoms are collected for imaging. Even the
minimal interaction between the electron beam and the surface material in this procedure can cause
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significant disturbance of the existing phase in PCM, which is not only useful for prevention of
data leakage but also provides the tamper-evidence property, which means revealing an attempt of
a physical attack, such as SEM imaging of a chip, by an unauthorized entity.
A PCM cell consists of a phase change material between two electrodes. This material can
remain either at a high resistance state (HRS or amorphous) or at a low resistance state (LRS or
crystalline). The phase change can be performed with an appropriate electrical or optical pulse. To
electrically change the phase from LRS to HRS, i.e. for reset or amorphization process, a
significantly high amplitude short electric pulse is applied so that a portion of the phase change
material in the cell melts. A fast fall time of the applied reset pulse is chosen to quench the material
quickly in order to form a disordered HRS state. On the other hand, for the phase change from
HRS to LRS, i.e. set or crystallization process, a longer electric pulse with moderate amplitude is
chosen so that the material temperature exceeds the crystallization temperature but stays below the
melting temperature. The longer duration of the set pulse ensures the misplaced atoms of the
amorphous state to return to their correctly ordered positions and thereby the LRS state is obtained
[47]. The large memory window between the LRS and HRS enables multi-level cell (MLC)
programming with several additional intermediate or mixed states, which increases capacity
without increasing area in the chip [55]. Hence, any significant disturbance caused by imaging can
mix densely-spaced states in MLC-based PCM.
As described in section 1.3.2.2 of Chapter 1 and in Chapter 5, the amorphous phase in PCM
undergoes a spontaneous increase of resistance followed by a decrease of resistance. The increase
of resistance is called the upward resistance drift, which follows a power law behavior. The slope
of the bi-logarithmic resistance vs. time plot is termed as drift exponent or drift coefficient [121].
Upward resistance drift occurs at room temperature and is accelerated at higher temperature [65].
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After the amorphous resistance reaches a maximum, a decrease of resistance takes place due to
crystallization. Even though these spontaneous resistance evolutions in PCM follows slightly
random trajectory on different cells or in different operation cycles of the same cell, these known
general trends can be used to characterize the extent of disturbance caused during an imaging
episode.
In this chapter, the extent of phase change induced by SEM imaging in GST line cells is
studied in terms of the measured resistance values before and after imaging. Prior to imaging, GST
cells are programmed to different resistance levels, and the spontaneous resistance evolutions are
monitored for each programmed cell. For different programmed resistance levels, some cells are
imaged, and the others are left unimaged. We continue monitoring the resistance evolutions for
both the imaged and unimaged cells and compare how much change is introduced in the resistance
evolution of the imaged cells in contrast with the unaffected resistance evolution of the unimaged
cells. Figure 6-1a shows the workflow of measurements performed on the imaged cells in this
chapter.

6.3

Methods

The GST line cells used for this study are 50 nm thick with bottom metal contact pads. These cells
are deposited on oxidized silicon substrates and capped with Si 3N4. All cells are of dog-bone shape
with ~100 nm width in the middle and ~420±20 nm length between the metal contacts (further
details on fabrication can be found in [65], [67]). Figure 6-1b shows an SEM image of an example
cell. Prior to programming the cells, all cells were initialized to the LRS by annealing at 675 K for
10 minutes. The resulting hexagonal close packed (hcp) states are then electrically characterized
at a room temperature probe station.
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Low voltage read operations with DC sweeps from -0.1 to +0.1 V were performed to read
the cell resistance at any stage of this study. A parameter analyzer was used to perform the DC
sweep read operations. A load resistance of ~1 kΩ was connected in series with the measured cell
to limit the current flowing through the cell during programming. To amorphize the cells, a
rectangular voltage pulse of 200 ns duration and 30 ns rise and fall time was applied. By applying
a single reset pulse with amplitudes varying between 2.4-3 V on different cells, amorphous
resistance values between ~20-70 MΩ were achieved. Due to programming variability, there were
slight variations in the programmed resistance values on different cells, even when the same reset
pulse amplitude was applied [100].

Figure 6-1: (a) Workflow of measurements. (b) SEM image of an example dog-bone GST line
cell. (c) Electrical characterization setup.
To program the cells to the intermediate states, similar pulse amplitude, duration, and rise
time were chosen; only the fall time of the applied voltage pulse was elongated to 200 ns to allow
slow crystallization inside the formed amorphous volume [63]. An arbitrary waveform generator
was used to generate the applied voltage pulses and an oscilloscope was used to measure the
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required output voltages. A relay circuit was used to automatically switch between read and pulse
operations without lifting probes in the middle of the measurements. Figure 6-1c shows the
experimental setup schematic. The resistance of each programmed cell was measured at ~10
seconds after applying the programming pulse, then initially at every ~9 s for a few minutes, and
afterwards at different times up to ~2×106 s (~23 days).
For all SEM imaging, moderate energy inputs of 5 kV and 0.4 nA were chosen. A working
distance of ~2 mm, magnification of ~200,000x (in full window view), SE mode, and a ‘through
the lens detector (TLD)’ were selected. 4 scans of 10 µs dwell time were used for imaging each
cell.

6.4

Results

First, the resistance evolutions for the unimaged cells at various programmed resistance levels
were monitored. Figure 6-2a shows the expected upward resistance drift trend of an unimaged
amorphous cell. The resistance drift coefficient (ν) was measured for three different elapsed time
segments and Figure 6-2a shows that ν gradually increases over time.
Figure 6-2b,c show the resistance drift trends from two intermediate resistance levels. It is
well known that ν for the initial upward resistance drift in cells programmed at the intermediate
states is much lower than that for fully amorphous cells [130]. Here, it is also observed that for
some cells programmed at the intermediate states, a maximum resistance is reached at the end of
the upward resistance drift, and then the decreasing resistance trend takes place, i.e. crystallization
begins (Figure 6-2b). Crystallization initiates at a much shorter elapsed time in the intermediate
states, which is below 106 s in Figure 6-2b, as compared to that in the fully amorphous states
(~2×107 s or ~7.5 months as reported in [65]).
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Figure 6-2: Spontaneous resistance evolution monitored for ~2×10 6 s (~23 days) since
programming for (a) an amorphous cell and (b,c) two cells programmed at intermediate states. The
upward resistance drift coefficient values (ν) were calculated at three segments of the measurement
period.
Some other cells programmed at the intermediate states, however, continue the upward
resistance drift through the end of the measurement (Figure 6-2c). Hence, it appears that the longterm resistance evolution trend for the intermediate state cells is more variable than that for the
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amorphous cells. The intermediate states are likely to form in very stochastic geometrical patterns
on different cells. During the long fall time of the applied programming pulse, the nucleated
crystalline islands in the amorphous volume can be formed at random locations. This random
arrangement of these islands on different cells is likely to cause the saturation of upward resistance
drift and initiation of crystallization process at different elapsed times. Moreover, an eventual
faster data-loss is expected in these cells programmed at intermediate states despite any variability,
as compared to those programmed to fully amorphous states [64], [101].
Figure 6-3 shows the upward resistance drift trends for 6 unimaged amorphous cells in
gray dotted lines with open symbols and 8 imaged amorphous cells in solid colored lines with
sphere symbols. Among these 8 imaged cells, 4 are imaged 1 day after programming (earlyimaging: Figure 6-3a) and the other 4 are imaged 11 days after programming (late-imaging: Figure
6-3b). For the 4 early-imaged cells, a sudden increase of resistance was observed upon the imaging
procedure, followed by a settling back to the usual drift trend, similar to the unimaged cells. The
average drift coefficient calculated in between the last two measured data-points (νavg) for the 6
unimaged cells was ~0.1353, and that for the 4 early-imaged cells (post-imaged) was practically
the same, ~ 0.1345.
On the other hand, for the 4 late-imaged cells, there was not only a sudden increase of
resistance upon imaging but also an acceleration of the upward resistance drift in between the two
measurements after imaging. The average drift coefficient measured with these two data points for
these 4 late-imaged cells is much higher (νavg of ~0.781) as compared to that for their unimaged
and early-imaged counterparts. These results indicate that the underlying physical mechanisms
behind the upward resistance drift in the amorphous GST cells, which has been attributed to
structural relaxation [121] and to charge trapping [131] processes, are affected by the high-energy
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imaging electron beam and the result of this interaction depends on the elapsed time after
amorphization at which beam exposure occurs (early vs. late-imaged cells). Understanding this
effect, however, requires further experiments and studies including the accurate estimation of the
cell temperature increase during the imaging procedure.

Figure 6-3: Spontaneous resistance evolution of unimaged and imaged amorphous PCM cells: 6
un-imaged cells (in gray dotted lines with open symbols) and 8 imaged cells (in solid colored lines
with sphere symbols). Among the 8 imaged cells: (a) 4 were imaged early (1 day after
programming) and (b) 4 were imaged late (11 days after programming). Insets show the magnified
views of R-t areas marked with the dashed rectangular boxes, where SEM imaging was performed.
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For the cells programmed at intermediate states, in which the resistance evolution trends
of the unimaged cells vary, these beam-induced disturbances of resistance are more significant and
lead to either increase or decrease in resistance on different cells. Figure 6-4 shows 7 unimaged
cells programmed at intermediate states (gray dotted lines with open symbols), with 4 of these
cells showing only upward resistance drift and the other 3 cells showing upward then downward
drift. Figure 6-4 also shows beam-induced erratic resistance evolutions of 3 imaged cells
programmed at intermediate states, plotted as solid colored lines with sphere symbols. While some
cells show increase in resistance, others show decrease. This indicates that the physical
mechanisms responsible for both upward resistance drift and crystallization might get accelerated
during imaging but with different magnitudes on different cells. Hence, some cells show a drop of
resistance possibly due to accelerated crystallization, whereas the others show increase in
resistance due to possible accelerated upward resistance drift during imaging. These speculations,
again, need further studies and computational estimates of the cell temperature.
The imaging beam-induced indelible changes in the resistance evolution clearly indicate
disturbances in the existing material in the programmed PCM cells. On one hand, this marks
challenges in imaging procedure, but on the other hand, it shows the promising tamper-evidence
property and disturbance of secret data stored in GST cells [6]. Since the resistance of a
programmed PCM cell is changed upon imaging, it thwarts the attacker by disturbing the
information stored in the device during the physical attack and by revealing the invasion attempt
to subsequent authorized users. Without imaging, it is difficult for an attacker to gain knowledge
about the chip layout. Since SEM imaging itself does not reveal the state of the imaged cell
(amorphous or crystalline) and further micro-probing attack is required to obtain the secret key,
the change of states during SEM imaging can mislead the attacker and jumble the secret key. This
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beam-induced disturbance of states and tamper-evidence properties can make PCM devices more
secure against physical imaging attacks, compared to CMOS devices for example, using the
inherent physical properties of GST, without requiring any additional security seal or mark.

Figure 6-4: Spontaneous resistance evolutions of unimaged and imaged PCM cells programmed
at intermediate states. The evolutions for the unimaged and imaged cells are plotted as ‘gray dotted
lines with open symbols’ and as ‘solid colored lines with sphere symbols’ respectively. The
instances of imaging of the 3 cells are as indicated. Two gray dotted lines showing upward
resistance drift only (with triangle and hexagonal open symbols) are thickened to distinguish their
trends from their peers with very similar trends (gray dotted lines with circle and pentagon open
symbols).
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6.5

Conclusion

We have characterized the disturbance in the existing resistance state of a phase change memory
nanodevice induced by the imaging electron beam of the scanning electron microscope. By
monitoring the spontaneous resistance evolutions at different programmed resistance levels of the
imaged and unimaged cells, the disturbances caused during imaging were identified. A sudden
increase of the amorphous resistance was observed for the amorphous GST cells during imaging.
For the cells programmed at the intermediate states, an unpredictable yet clear change was
observed.
Any disturbance of existing state in a memory device can be detrimental for reliable
operation in densely-spaced multi-level cell programming schemes. The significant disturbances
observed from the experimental results indicate the challenges associated with imaging of PCM
nanodevices, which is, conversely, promising for the alteration of stored secret keys and for the
tamper-evidence property of GST cells, making PCM more secure against invasive imaging
attacks.

144

Chapter 7 | Optical Characterization of ZnO Nanoforest for Hardware Security
7.1

Abstract

Disordered systems or materials with intrinsic variability in some measurable quantity are recently
being considered for hardware security applications like physical unclonable functions or PUFs.
An inexpensive optical PUF system based on a dense nanoforest of ZnO nanorods is presented
here. A relatively concentrated seed solution used in the synthesis process results in these high
density nanorods grown mostly in the upright direction with some vertical hollow spots in between
neighboring nanorods. This nanorod arrangement grown on optically reflective substrates works
as a nano-porous thin film and produces Fabry-Pérot fringes under perpendicularly incident
focused white light. The local variations in density, height, diameter, orientation angle, and
hexagonal perfection of the ZnO nanorods give rise to unique and reproducible scattering light
spectra that vary significantly from one spot on the sample to another. Over 1500 optical
measurements are performed to show the strongly variable optical characteristics. These distinct
spectra show promise as the raw responses for ZnO-based optical PUFs.

7.2

Introduction

As described in previous chapters, hardware security is a growing need in the current age of
‘internet of things’. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) can provide security to essential
hardware devices that remotely control sensitive applications and exchange private information by
providing a unique identity to each device. PUFs are made of partly disordered physical systems
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that cannot be cloned. The output or ‘response’ generated from a PUF depends on an externally
applied input or ‘challenge’ and the unique and unclonable disorder present in the system. Various
types of PUFs have been implemented using electrical, optical, and other types of systems with
measurable stochastic quantities [6].
A token-based inexpensive optical PUF made of randomly placed glass spheres was
reported by Pappu et al. and was the first demonstration of a PUF [9]. The disordered system
contained randomly arranged sub-millimeter size light scattering glass spheres (~500 µm in
diameter) inside a token and the challenge was the angle at which a laser light was shone. The light
was scattered across the 3-dimensional token via a random path through the glass spheres, and the
raw response was the speckle pattern generated on a screen, which was unique for each angle [9].
The large number of challenge response pairs (CRPs) made that design a strong PUF, but the
sensitive optical system was reported to pose some challenges for reliable reproduction of the
CRPs [10]. Moreover, the source of variability of this glass sphere-based optical PUF is the random
mixing or placement of the individual glass spheres inside the token, which may be readable as
indicated by a recent work by Malkiel et al. [132], where a deep learning approach was used to
predict a nano-structure geometry from its far-field optical response. Once this arrangement is
read, cloning can easily be performed.
Hence, a disordered system, in which the variability is not only naturally occurring but also
is irreproducible due to the inherent features present in processing or growth procedures can ensure
better security with the essential unclonable feature of PUF. Exploiting the variable optical
properties arising from the intrinsic randomness present at the micro- and nano-scales of different
materials or structures can lead to new advances in the field of optical PUFs. Kursawe et al.
demonstrated a reconfigurable optical PUF using a polymer layer containing randomly distributed
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light scattering particles [34]. ZnO can also be a good choice of material to introduce randomness
since it easily forms into intricate nanostructures using a variety of synthesis processes. ZnO is a
direct bandgap semiconductor with useful optoelectronic and piezoelectric properties [133]. It is
also an inexpensive material, found in abundance in nature, is environment-friendly, anti-bacterial,
and bio-compatible. Among several morphologies of ZnO nanostructures, ZnO nanorods (NRs)
have the hexagonal Wurtzite crystalline structure and can be grown with inexpensive solutionbased synthesis processes [133].
We have grown ZnO nanoforests with dense arrays of ZnO NRs using chemical bath
deposition (CBD) technique, a low-cost solution-based synthesis process, on optically reflective,
opaque, and transparent substrates. Optical characterization of the light scattered from the ZnO
NRs was performed by shining focused white light at different spots on the samples. Due to the
inherent spatial variations of the nucleated ZnO NRs and the random dimensions of individual
NRs, highly stochastic scattered light spectra were observed from one spot to the other on the
samples of dense small ZnO NRs grown on the reflective substrates. The applications of these
stochastic optical properties for hardware security are discussed in this chapter.

7.3

ZnO NRs Synthesis Process

Before the growth process, all substrates were cleaned with deionized water, soap solution, and
ethanol and dried with nitrogen. The CBD synthesis process was initiated with the seed solution
preparation step (Figure 7-1a), with 0.0457 gm of zinc acetate dihydrate [Zn(Ch 3Coo)2.2H2O] and
50 ml of ethanol [C2H6O]. Next, the top surface of the clean and dry substrates was drop-coated
with the prepared seed solution (Figure 7-1b). Then, the samples were heated on a hot plate at 350°
C for 30 minutes (Figure 7-1c). Finally, a pre-cursor solution was prepared with 25 mM of zinc
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nitrate hexahydrate [Zn(NO3)2.6H2O], 25 mM of hexamethylenetetramine [(CH₂)₆N₄] and 6 mM
of polyethyleneimine [(C2H5N)n] in water; the samples were dipped into the pre-cursor solution at
a ~45° angle and annealed at 90° C for 24 hours (Figure 7-1d). Further details on the CBD synthesis
procedure can be found in Refs. [134]–[140].

Figure 7-1: Schematic of the ZnO nanoforest growth process steps – (a) preparation of seed
solution, (b) drop coating of the seed solution on the substrates, (c) sintering at 350°C for 30
minutes, and (d) annealing the samples in a precursor solution in an oven at 90°C for 24 hours
[134].
Two sizes of NRs were grown: NRs with diameter ~200 nm were produced with a
concentrated seed solution (with smaller molar concentration of water), (Figure 7-2e-h), whereas
larger NRs, ~500 nm in diameter, were achieved with diluted seed solution (with larger molar
concentration of water) (Figure 7-2i-l) [134], [140]. These small and large NRs were grown on 3
types of substrates (Figure 7-2 shows the cross-section schematics of the substrates in the 1 st row
and the scanning electron microscope (SEM) images of all samples in the 2 nd and 3rd rows):
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Figure 7-2: 1st row: Cross-section schematics of the substrates used in this chapter: (a) ~550 nm
thick SiO2 film on p−-sc-Si, (b) ~130 nm thick p++ poly-Si film deposited on top of ~550 nm thick
SiO2 film and p−-sc-Si, (c) p−-sc-Si, and (d) FTO-coated glass substrate. 2nd and 3rd rows: False
colored scanning electron microscope (SEM) images of ZnO NRs with average diameter of (e)
~200 nm on SiO2, (f) ~200 nm on p++-poly-Si, (g) ~100 nm on p−-sc-Si, (h) ~100 nm on FTO
glass, (i)~400 nm on SiO2, (j) ~600 nm on p++-poly-Si, (k) ~500 nm on p−-sc-Si, and (l) ~400 nm
on FTO.
i.

optically reflective substrates –two substrates of this type were used: silicon dioxide (SiO2)
and highly doped p-type poly-crystalline silicon (p++-poly-Si) on SiO2 – both deposited on
low-doped p-type single crystal Si (Figure 7-2a,b,e,f,i,j),
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ii.

optically opaque substrate – lightly doped p-type single crystal silicon (p−-sc-Si) (Figure
7-2c,g,k),

iii.

optically transparent substrate – fluorine doped tin oxide (FTO) coated glass (Figure
7-2d,h,l).
ZnO NRs with the characteristic wurtzite structure were observed on all samples.

7.4

Optical Studies

Focused white light was shone vertically on the ZnO nanoforest samples using an ECO light source
150 (180 W) and an optical microscope. A portion of the scattered light from the ZnO NRs was
captured by an optical fiber placed at ~45° angle. The optical fiber was attached to a mechanical
micro-positioner and kept at a fixed location and orientation. The optical fiber was connected to a
wide-band (200-1100 nm) optical spectrum analyzer (Ocean Optics HR2000+) to collect and
analyze the scattered light (Figure 7-3).

Figure 7-3: Schematic of the optical measurement setup on the ZnO nanoforest samples.
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An integration time of 50 ms was used for the spectrometer and a 20x lens magnification
was used for all measurements (Figure 7-3). The light source was moved over the nanoforest
samples, and the light spectra scattered from different locations were recorded. Hence, the
challenge of the proposed PUF is the 2-dimentional co-ordinate of the illuminated spot and the
raw response is the scattered light spectrum.

7.5

Results

The scattered light spectra recorded from different spots on the ZnO NR samples grown on the
optically opaque and transparent substrates only showed slight variations in intensity. The same
was true for the large ZnO NRs grown on the optically reflective substrates. Figure 7-4 shows the
similar scattered light spectra recorded at 10 different spots on the large ZnO NRs grown on the
p++-poly-Si substrate and an example of the corresponding optical microscope image of this sample
is shown in the inset.

Figure 7-4: Scattered optical spectra recorded at 10 different spots on the ~600 nm ZnO NRs on
p++-poly-Si sample. Spectrum analyzer integration time: 50 ms. Inset shows an example optical
microscope image of the sample. Optical microscope lens magnification: 20x.
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It was only the smaller ZnO NRs grown on the optically reflective substrates that showed
very interesting variable spectra from different locations. Figure 7-5a shows the distinct scattered
light spectra at 5 different spots on the small ZnO NRs grown on p ++-poly-Si. The solid black line
represents the low-intensity scattered spectrum from the bare p ++-poly-Si substrate (without ZnO
NR grown on top). Due to the very high optical reflectance of this substrate, almost all the incident
focused light reflects vertically, and no light is detected at the optical fiber placed at ~45° angle.
Figure 7-5b-g show the corresponding optical microscope images of the bare p++-poly-Si substrate
and the 5 spots from the small ZnO NRs grown on p++-poly-Si. The microscope images of these 5
spots (Figure 7-5c-g) look remarkably identical despite their significantly different scattered light
spectra (Figure 7-5a) [141].

Figure 7-5: (a) Scattered optical spectra from the bare p++-poly-Si (low-intensity solid black line)
and at 5 different locations of ~200 nm ZnO NRs on p++-poly-Si sample. (b-g) Corresponding
optical microscope images.
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Additional SEM imaging of the samples of small NRs on reflective substrates (Figure
7-2e,f) was performed (Figure 7-6) to understand the possible physical mechanisms behind the
large variations in the scattered optical spectra. It was observed that the NRs on these samples
(Figure 7-2e,f) are denser than the other small NRs grown on the opaque and transparent substrates
(Figure 7-2g,h). Perhaps more importantly, these NRs (Figure 7-2e,f) are aligned mostly in the
vertical direction with very little or no inclination (Figure 7-6a-c), as compared to the larger NRs
in Figure 7-2i-l, resulting in more of a nano-porous film with optical spectra similar to those
observed in the nano-porous silicon and anodic aluminum oxide films [142], [143]. Figure 7-6b
also shows rough top surface of the NRs that can lead to more randomly scattered light from these
samples, and Figure 7-6d shows the irregularities in the ideal hexagonal crystalline perfection and
the randomness corresponding to diameter and height. The light waves that directly reflect from
the top surface of the ZnO NRs and the ones that refract through the ZnO NRs and are then
reflected from the substrate interfere, leading to Fabry-Pérot fringes. When the light source is
moved over different spots, the wavelengths at which constructive and destructive optical
interference occur change significantly, due to the local random arrangements of NRs, resulting in
distinct scattered fringes.
For the samples grown on opaque substrate, the refracted light was absorbed in the
substrate, and for the ones grown on the transparent substrate, refracted light was transmitted
through the substrate. No Fabry-Pérot fringes were observed on the samples grown on these
substrates. The larger nanorods on the reflective substrates, which did not form nano-porous-like
thin films, did not produce Fabry-Pérot fringes either.
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Figure 7-6: SEM images of ~200 nm ZnO NRs on p++-poly-Si at (a, b) 45° angle and (c) 90° angle
(cross-section). (d) Top view SEM image.
Figure 7-7 shows the scattered light spectra monitored at 652 locations on the small ZnO
NRs grown on the p++-poly-Si substrate in (a) and at 838 locations on the small ZnO NRs grown
on the SiO2 substrate in (b). The significant randomness observed in the scattered light spectra in
Figure 7-7a,b is shown quantitively in terms of the index of dispersion, which refers to the ratio of
the variance to the mean in Figure 7-7c. As values of index of dispersion greater than 1 indicates
high variations, the very large values obtained for all wavelengths in Figure 7-7c indicate that these
random scattered light spectra are promising candidates as the raw responses for optical PUF
primitives.
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Figure 7-7: Strong variability observed at the scattered light spectra monitored from (a) 652
locations on the ~200 nm ZnO NRs on p++-poly-Si sample and (b) 838 locations on the ~200 nm
ZnO NRs on SiO2 sample. (c) Index of dispersion (i.e. variance over mean) for the random spectra
shown in (a) and (b).
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7.6

Conclusion

Random nanorod arrangements in dense ZnO nanoforest grown on optically reflective substrates
with inexpensive solution-based synthesis techniques result in significant variability in scattered
optical spectra when focused white light is vertically incident on different spots of the sample. The
observed spectra resemble Fabry-Pérot interference fringes, likely due to the multiple reflections
from ZnO nanorods and substrate surface. Even if a certain ZnO nanorod arrangement can be
modeled in the future from the observed scattered optical spectra, the complex, random and, 3dimensional nano-scale arrangements cannot be reproduced because of the inherent randomness
present in the solution-based synthesis technique. This unclonable property of the proposed ZnO
nanoforest makes it more suitable for the PUF applications than the previously reported glasssphere-based optical system [9], [10].
Optical spectra were obtained from more than 1500 illuminated spots on two optically
reflective substrates. Further quantization analysis, such as the Gabor transform used by Pappu et
al. [9], is required to generate digital responses from these analog raw spectral responses. Further
efforts to integrate entire optical systems on chip, such as the one proposed by Rührmair et al. with
aligned light source and sensor arrays [10], can eventually make these PUFs practical. Although
the proposed ZnO optical PUF is not reconfigurable, its low-cost, simple and environment-friendly
production, and high variability and unclonability features, can render it useful in various hardware
security scenarios.
The variability observed in the scattered optical spectra from these small ZnO NRs on the
reflective substrates cannot be modified or reconfigured later. Once these samples are grown, the
random yet static secret keys are generated based on the uncontrolled solution-based synthesis
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process. Hence, if all CRPs are rigorously measured by a physical attack attempt, the static secret
key is lost. Despite the unclonable feature of the hardware security primitives based on such static
sources of physical randomness, the security against physical attack is vulnerable due to the
inability to reconfigure the CRPs further. In contrast, PUFs based on the programming variability
of phase change memory and other non-volatile memory technologies ensure robust security
against physical attacks for their reconfigurable properties.
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Chapter 8 | Outlook
Phase change memory (PCM) provides a new platform for hardware security primitives, such as
physical unclonable functions (PUFs), true random number generators, and time-sensitive memory
applications, enabled through several unique properties of PCM:
-

programming variability due to complex mechanisms behind amorphization and
crystallization processes of phase-change materials that cannot be reproduced, predicted or
modeled exactly;

-

high endurance devices that enable very large (practically unlimited) sets of refreshed, nonvolatile challenge-response pairs;

-

read disturb and thermal cross-talk effects that can potentially be used for tamper evidence
schemes;

-

resistance drifts of the amorphous and crystalline fcc states that add to the intrinsic
programming variability in following cycles.
Although extensive research efforts have made PCM the well-established memory

technology it is today, most have focused on improving memory performance, which includes
minimizing variability, and only a few reports have discussed the intentional use of variability for
hardware security. In this dissertation, electrical characterization of PCM line cells have been
presented for feasible implementation of several hardware security primitives based on PCM
devices. Figure 8-1 shows a summary of the contributions of this dissertation and outlook to extend
each of these contributed areas.
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Figure 8-1: Summary of the contributions of this dissertation and the outlook for further works.
To advance the performance of PCM-based PUFs (discussed in Chapter 2 and 3), new cell
design and material search can be the next steps. To understand the underlying physical
mechanisms for the variations involved in the amorphized locations, shapes, and sizes (discussed
in Chapter 4), in-situ transmission electron microscopy (TEM) can be done. In-situ TEM can also
improve the current understanding of underlying physical mechanisms for spontaneous resistance
evolution in PCM (discussed in Chapter 5) and the disturbances caused by imaging beam on this
evolution (discussed in Chapter 6). Finally, further efforts in producing digital output bits from the
raw analog responses of the ZnO-based PUF (discussed in Chapter 7) are required for security
implementations.
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